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INTRODUCTION

Pauley v. Kelly' was a decision ahead of its time. The West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals' 1979 articulation of the state constitutional right to
education effectively blended the demands of quality education and reasonably
equal education in ways that anticipate a scholarly consensus that would fully
emerge only decades later.2 The court aimed high, sketching the contours of a

Jackson Kelly Professor, West Virginia University College of Law. I gratefully
acknowledge the financial support provided for this work by an Arthur B. Hodges Research Grant.
I also thank my colleagues Robert Bastress and Joshua Weishart for their contributions to my
understanding of these issues. I have learned more from them than my frequent citations to their
writings reflect. All errors, however, are mine.

1

255 S.E.2d 859 (W. Va. 1979).

See infra notes 125-138 and accompanying text. Scholars have
long drawn a contrast
between aiming at equality or equity of educational resources and aiming at achieving some level
of educational quality or adequacy. See generally Peter Enrich, Leaving Equality Behind: New
Directions in School Finance Reform, 48 VAND. L. REv. 101 (1995); Joshua E.
Weishart,
Transcending Equality Versus Adequacy, 66 STAN. L. REv. 477 (2014) [hereinafter Weishart,
Transcending].I characterize Pauley as insisting on both "quality" and "equality" rather than the
2
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"thorough and efficient" education' that would develop the capacities of the
state's youth "as best the state of education expertise allows."' Indeed, Pauley
offered the most detailed and sophisticated conception of the right to education
that any court had offered at the time, and it remains one of the most insightful
accounts even today.
These points would make the Pauley decision worthy of remembrance
in its own right, but the full legacy of Pauley includes the education policy
dialogue it spawned between the courts, the elected branches, and the people of
West Virginia-a dialogue that lasted nearly a quarter of a century in the courts
and that continues to shape education policy in West Virginia today. The key
actor in much of this dialogue was Judge Arthur M. Recht, who passed away in
October 2018 and is memorialized elsewhere in this volume. Although other
judges' took charge of the circuit court litigation at various points, Judge Recht
was there at both the beginning and the end of the post-Pauley dialogue. Most
famously, he translated Pauley's constitutional principles into a detailed
framework for what a thorough, efficient, and reasonably equal system of West
Virginia schools would look like. Known as "the Recht Decision" since it came
down on May 11, 1982, the judge's 244-page opinion on remand from Pauley
put the ball in the legislature's court.' It challenged other state actors and the
people of West Virginia to adopt its educational vision or some alternative one
that courts could recognize as responsive to West Virginia's constitutional
mandates. Even more clearly than Pauley itself, the Recht Decision was ahead
of its time in holding that the right to education must be understood to include
both quality standards and a commitment to reasonable equality that includes
recognition of the greater educational needs of poor students.'
more common language of equality (or equity) and "adequacy" because "adequacy" carries

minimalist connotations that do not fit Pauley. My characterization of Pauley as pursuing both
quality and equality is certainly not novel. When one reads the decision with the benefit of forty
years' hindsight, the point practically leaps off the page. For a brief, incisive appreciation of Pauley
making the same point, see Joshua Weishart, The Legacy of Pauley v. Kelly, JOSHUA WEISHART:
WV ED LAW BLOG (Feb. 23, 2018), https://joshuaweishart.com/the-legacy-of-pauley-v-kelly/ (last
visited March 20, 2019) [hereinafter Weishart, Legacy].

§ 1.

3

W. VA. CONST. art. XII,

4

Pauley, 255 S.E.2d at 877.

The other Circuit Court judges who oversaw various stages of the case were the Honorable
Jerry W. Cook, the Honorable Robert G. Chafin, and the Honorable Dan Robinson.
Pauley v. Bailey (Recht Decision), No. 75-1268 (Kanawha Cty. Cir. Ct., May 11, 1982); see
6
also Richard Meckley & Helen M. Hazi, Roadblocks on the Way to School Reform in West
Virginia, 7 INT'L J. EDUC. REFORM, 338, 339 (1998) (noting that Judge Recht's May 11, 1982
opinion in Pauley v. Bailey is commonly known as "the Recht Decision").
Scholars who emphasize the importance of equality in school financing schemes make a
7
variety of subsidiary distinctions, including one between horizontal equity (equal dollars expended
for the education of each student) and vertical equity (providing more dollars to students with
greater educational needs). See, e.g., William S. Koski & Rob Reich, When "Adequate" Isn 't: The
Retreatfrom Equity in EducationalLaw and Policy and Why It Matters, 56 EMORY L. J. 545, 553
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Both Pauley and the Recht Decision were also ahead of their time in a
less celebratory sense because West Virginia was not yet ready to prioritize
educational quality and equality to the degree that these decisions demanded.'
The Recht Decision had insisted that eliminating the school "excess levy"additional property taxes that school districts can impose on themselves through
special elections9-was
critical to promoting equal rights to meaningful
educational opportunity in West Virginia. Eliminating the excess levy, however,
would have required new sources of state funding that West Virginia was unable
and/or unwilling to provide. By the time Judge Recht relinquished jurisdiction
over the Pauley litigation in 2003,0 the excess levy seemed more invulnerable
than ever.
Still, the Pauley litigation produced significant change despite falling
short of its most ambitious goals. In his final order in the case, Judge Recht
stressed that even though the state had never fully implemented the vision of the
Recht Decision and the Master Plan for Education that followed it, the legislature
had finally articulated its own constitutionally sufficient vision of a thorough and
efficient education through the adoption of House Bill 4306" in 1998.12 Going
forward, the accountability standards outlined in the 1998 legislation would
define a thorough and efficient education based on educational outputs (i.e. tests
demonstrating mastery of state-defined content standards) rather than inputs (i.e.
resources like curriculum, teachers, and facilities). Perhaps this was not the
courts' original vision of a thorough and efficient education, but the education
duty rests with the legislature, not the courts. And Judge Recht could fairly claim
that, for the first time, the legislature had addressed that duty with the appropriate
senousness.
Pauley's end may seem somewhat anticlimactic in its deference to the
legislature, especially for a case sometimes regarded as a monument to judicial

(2006); Gloria M. Rodriguez, Vertical Equity in School Financeand the Potentialfor Increasing
School Responsiveness to Student andStaffNeeds, 79 PEABODY J. OF EDUC. 7, 11 (2004). My claim
in the text is that Pauley, at least when read through the lens of the Recht Decision, embraces
vertical equity.
See, e.g., Richard Meckley, Education Finance: Legal Bombshells in West Virginia, 8 J.
EDUC. FIN. 409, 412 (1983) [hereinafter Meckley, Bombshells] (documenting legislative reaction
to the Recht Decision's cost, then estimated to be as much as $1.6 billion); Jonathan P. Sher,
BringingHome the Bacon: The Politics of Rural School Reform, PHI DELTA KAPPAN, Dec. 1983,
at 279, 281 (describing Governor Rockefeller's reaction to the decision).
9
See infra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
10
Tomblin v. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ., No. 75-1268 (Kanawha Cty. Cir.
Ct., Jan. 3,
2003).
"
An Act Implementing Certain Recommendations of the Commission on
Educational
Quality and Equity, 73d Leg. (W. Va. 1998) (current version at W. VA. CODE ANN. § 18-2E-5
(West 2019)).
12
Tomblin, slip op. at 5-6.
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overreach," but West Virginia courts were always at least slightly more
ambivalent about their own role than conventional wisdom would suggest.
Pauley's end was consistent with one-though certainly not all-of the
conceptions of judicial review that ran through the litigation: a conception in
which the main purpose of judicial review is to prompt the legislature to develop
its own standards defining the type of education state constitutions require. Even
on this more modest conception, though, questions remain about whether the
legislature has lived up to the goals it set for itself in 1998. The state still does
not appear ready to fully embrace Pauley's aspirations-even in the more modest
form accepted by Judge Recht in 2003. Whether that is the fault of the courts or
the state remains very much open to debate. Indeed, this spring's controversy
over the Senate's proposed education reform bill, Senate Bill ("S.B.") 45 1,14 and
the West Virginia teachers' strikes of 2018 and 2019 were in part a contest over
6
Pauley's legacy.'
In this Foreword, I provide an overview of Pauley's story and offer some
reflections on its complex legacy. Part II describes the legal context in which the
Pauley litigation arose, situating the case in relation to early school finance
litigation and describing the features of the West Virginia school finance system
challenged by the Pauleyplaintiffs." In Part III, I review the Pauley opinion with
particular attention to the court's conceptions of the right to education and of its
authority to engage in judicial review of the legislature's efforts to honor that
right." Part IV shows that the conventional division of school finance litigation
into "equity" and "adequacy" waves fails to do justice to Pauley." In fact,
Pauley's approach anticipates contemporary scholarship recognizing that the
contrast between equity and adequacy in school finance litigation is a false
See, e.g., Jonathan R. Werner, No Knight in Shining Armor: Why Courts Alone, Absent
13
Public Engagement, Could Not Achieve Successful Public School Finance Reform in West
Virginia, 35 CoLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 61, 70-75 (2002).
S.B. 451, 84th Leg. (W. Va. 2019). A chronological account of the latter stages of the bill's
14
passage through the legislature and its ultimate defeat in the wake of a two-day teacher's strike can
be found at https://www.wsaz.com/content/news/Members-of-WVaHouse-of-Delegates-respond3 2 72 9
1.html. See Phil Kabler, Statehouse Beat:
to-education-omnibus-bill-passing-in-Senate-505
2019),
23,
(Feb.
GAZETTE-MAIL
CHARLESTON
Bill,
Bad
a
for
Requiem
https://www.wvgazettemail.com/news/columnists/phil kabler/statehouse-beat-reqiuem-for-a-

bad-bill/article 18830cO6-c4Oc-57dl-ald4-93f48d0564a6.html.
15
Strike,

For a brief account, see Ryan Quinn, A Look Back at the 2018 WVPublic School Employees
CHARLESTON

https://www.wvgazettemail.com/

GAZETTE-MAIL
20

(Mar.

28,

2018),

18wvteachers strike/a-look-back-at-the-wv-public-school-

employees-strike/article_cOdcd2db-4017-5bcd-b433-6b3afb6c3d57.html.
16

See Joshua Weishart, On the Legality of the Teacher Strike, JOSHUA WEISHART: WV ED
(last

LAW BLOG (Mar. 1, 2018), https://joshuaweishart.com/on-the-legality-of-the-teacher-strike/

visited April 2, 2019).
17
5

19

See infra notes 26-65 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 66-99 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 100-139 and accompanying text.
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opposition. In Part V, I examine the Recht Decision, which offered a strikingly
detailed blueprint for the future of education in West Virginia and gave greater
specificity to Pauley 's understanding of the right to education. 20 As my main
purpose here is to contextualize Pauley and the Recht Decision, I cannot explore
all the steps in the continuing dialogue between the courts, other government
actors, and the public that stretched over the next two decades. In Part VI,
however, I quickly review what I regard as the most critical moment in that
dialogue: the Supreme Court of Appeals' ruling in Board of Education v.
Chafin21 that the excess levy is outside the scope of Pauley's mandate.22 This
decision effectively transformed Pauley into an adequacy case and thus lowered
the bar that the legislature would need to clear to satisfy Pauley's demands. Part
VII discusses Judge Recht's decision in 2003 to relinquish jurisdiction over the
case in response to the legislature's adoption of a school accountability plan in
1998 and raises questions about whether the legislature has lived up to Judge
Recht's expectations.23 Part VIII briefly reflects on Pauley's accomplishments
and its unfinished business.24
In telling the story of Pauley v. Kelly, I make a number of thematic
claims that I will preview here. First, Pauley emphasized educational quality and
equality, seeing both as critically important. It was perhaps not wholly clear on
the exact relationship between them, but the basic insight was there from the
beginning, and consequently the case deserves more attention than most scholars
have given it. Second, Pauley wrestled forthrightly with the thorny question of
the scope of judicial review in school finance litigation but never completely
resolved it. Uncertainty about the respective roles of the legislature and judiciary
in defining the right to education would persist throughout the Pauley saga.
Third, the Recht Decision did much more than apply Pauley's principles to the
facts developed at trial. Judge Recht further refined Pauley's mandate to specify
that West Virginia students have a constitutional right to a high-quality education
with roughly equal resources. While the Recht Decision is best known for the
detail with which it spelled out demanding quality standards, its focus on
eliminating the local school excess levy showed that even the highest standards
would not be enough if some districts retained the ability to provide their children
with advantages that others could never enjoy. In Judge Recht's
conceptualization, the excess levy had to be replaced in order to tie the fortunes
of all West Virginians together by placing nearly the entire burden of education
funding on the state. As things turned out, elimination of the excess levy proved
to be the Recht Decision's white whale. Fourth, the Recht Decision appeared to
embrace an aggressive vision of judicial review that authorized courts to define
20

See infra notes 140-182 and accompanying text.

21

376 S.E.2d 113 (W. Va. 1988).

22

See infra notes 183-200 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 201-267 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 268-286 and accompanying text.

23
24
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the parameters of a thorough and efficient education on their own, yet Judge
Recht also carried forward some of Pauley's ambivalence about the judicial role.
He appears to have seen himself-at least part of the time-as prompting
legislative action without dictating its specific content. Fifth, the Chafin case
transformed the goals of the Pauley litigation by ruling that the excess levy was
constitutionally untouchable. Post-Chafin, educational quality would have to be
the driving goal of Pauley since the excess levy would always allow those in
property-rich counties to confer additional advantages on their own children. At
most, West Virginia schools would provide a high-quality educational "floor"
for all while recognizing the greater educational needs and costs of poor counties.
To borrow a phrase from the literature, Pauley's mandate became one of
25
"adequacy," which in turn implied some commitment to "vertical equity."
Sixth, Judge Recht ultimately withdrew from the case not just because he
recognized the limits of judicial power, but also because he believed the
legislature had finally made a meaningful commitment to provide a thorough and
efficient school system by adopting an accountability system that would both
define the goals of education and precisely identify where additional resources
should be directed so that all might have a fair opportunity to attain those goals.
In other words, the legislature had adopted a defensible vision of what Pauley's
mandate might mean in the wake of Chafin. While I acknowledge that there is a
hint of the white flag in Judge Recht's decision, his exit can also be seen as
consistent with a relatively modest conception of judicial review that had been
present in the Pauley litigation all along. Seventh, I suggest that even on a theory
of judicial review where the courts' job is mainly to ensure that legislatures aim
at their constitutionally appointed ends, there is room to wonder whether the
West Virginia courts left the battlefield prematurely.
II.

THE ROAD TO PA ULEY V. KELLY AND THE RECHT DECISION

A. The Early Days of School FinanceEquity Litigation
The story of school finance equity litigation spans half a century at this
point, and it is still ongoing. In the late 1960s, using the courts to reform school
financing seemed a logical extension of the still-unfinished project of Brown v.
Board of Education.2 6 Brown had spoken eloquently of the foundational
importance of education in American society,27 and it had ruled that depriving
some students of educational opportunity on the basis of race was
unconstitutional. It was obvious, of course, that race was not the only basis on
which educational opportunity was unfairly distributed. Anyone could see that

25

See generally Julie K. Underwood, School Finance Adequacy as Vertical Equity, 28 U.

MICH. J.L. REF. 493 (1995).
26
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
27
See id. at 493.
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public schools in different communities differed widely in quality and that these
qualitative differences were highly correlated with differences in the financial
resources supporting those schools. The resource disparities, in turn, were a
function of state decisions to require localities to supply a significant amount of
school funding through local property taxes. Since property tax revenues
depended on the property wealth of the district, reliance on local property taxes
guaranteed that schools would not be funded equally. If it was arbitrary and
unconstitutional for a child to receive a substandard education because of the
color of her skin, surely it was just as arbitrary and unconstitutional for a child
to receive a substandard education because of the property wealth of the district
in which she lived. The intuitive case for school finance reform as an extension
of Brown, then, was a strong one. And as the Court backed away from full
commitment to Brown in Milliken v. Bradley,2 8 school finance litigation assumed
still greater importance as a partial substitute for integration.2 9
Early school finance equity cases relied on the federal Equal Protection
Clause. After school finance reformers had scored what seemed a bellwether
victory with the California Supreme Court's 1971 decision in Serrano v. Priest
(Serrano ),30 the strategy of relying on federal equal protection principles came
to an abrupt end with the U.S. Supreme Court's 1973 decision in San Antonio
Independent School Districtv. Rodriguez.31 The Rodriguez plaintiffs challenged
Texas's school finance system and its reliance on local property taxes as
violating equal protection principles by making the quality of a child's education
depend on the property wealth of her school district. This system, the challengers
argued, should be subjected to strict scrutiny review because its reliance on local
property taxes discriminated against the poor as a suspect class and also affected
the right to education, a fundamental right under the U.S. Constitution. The
Supreme Court rejected both claims. First, it concluded that there was an
insufficient correlation between being poor and living in a district with a lowproperty tax base, thus the system was not truly a classification based on
poverty.32 Further, the Court's precedents suggesting that poverty was a suspect
class had all involved total deprivation of the item sought, but the students at
issue in Rodriguez had not been totally deprived of education. 33 Accordingly, the
"suspect class" inquiry failed to yield a strict scrutiny standard of review. The
Court further ruled that "fundamental rights" for equal protection purposes must
28

418 U.S. 717 (1974). For a detailed account placing Milliken in its
social context and
explaining its importance as a turning point in the story of Brown's implementation, see JAMES E.
RYAN, FIVE MILES AWAY, A WORLD APART 91-117 (2010) [hereinafter RYAN, FIVE MILES AWAY].

29
See James E. Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, 109 YALE L. J.
249, 258-66 (1999)
[hereinafter Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money].
30
487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971).
31

411 U.S. 1 (1973).

32

Id. at 22-23.

33

Id. at 23-25.
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be rooted in constitutional text, 34 an approach that doomed the challengers' claim
since there is no textual right to education in the federal constitution. Applying
rational basis review, the Court readily upheld Texas's scheme as justified by the
35
traditional interest in local control of education. Apart from the equal protection
doctrinal analysis just recited and general concerns about the competence of
courts to second-guess complex legislative judgments about funding schools,
federalism concerns doubtless influenced the Court as well. Texas's funding
36
scheme was quite typical of state schemes across the country, and a contrary
ruling would have set up the federal courts for a second round of supervising
state and local decision making when the first round of desegregation cases was
still in full swing.
37
While Rodriguez marked the (apparent) end of the federal chapter, the
story of school finance litigation was really just beginning. Only thirteen days
after Rodriguez was handed down, the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled in
Robinson v. Cahill that New Jersey's method of financing its public schools
38
violated the Education Clause of the New Jersey Constitution. This state
constitutional claim, like the federal claims in Rodriguez, raised serious
questions about the separation of powers and the judicial role. Yet the absence
of federalism concerns and the possibility of states adopting different paths
39
(rather than the Supreme Court mandating one solution for the entire country)
gave school reformers a fighting chance. In addition, because every state
40
constitution confers a right to free public education, claims based on the
fundamental rights strand of equal protection promised to be stronger at the state
than at the federal level. In Robinson's wake, challenges were brought in a
number of other states with mixed results. Prior to Pauley, state supreme courts
in California (1976)41, Connecticut (1977)42, and Washington (1978)43 hadjoined

34
35
36

Id. at 33-35.
Id. at 49-53.
Id. at 44.

I say "apparent" because there has been some renewed interest of late in establishing a
3
limited federal constitutional right to education. See, e.g., Derek Black, The FundamentalRight to
Education, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1059 (2019); Barry Friedman & Sara Solow, The Federal
Right to an Adequate Education, 81 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 92 (2013). Recent litigation invoking
education rights under the federal constitution has been unsuccessful. See Gary B. v. Snyder, 329
F. Supp. 3d 344 (E.D. Mich. 2018); Martinez v. Malloy, 350 F. Supp. 3d 74 (D. Conn. 2018).
38
303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973).
3

See JEFFREY S. SurrON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS: STATES AND THE MAKING OF AMERICAN
36-41 (2018).

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

Enrich, supra note 2, at 105. Enrich explains that there is room for debate on whether
Mississippi has this constitutional guarantee, but at least 49 states do.
Serrano v. Priest (Serrano ll), 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976).
41
42
Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359 (Conn. 1977).
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1978).
43
40
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financing systems under their state

B. Pauley Begins: The Lincoln County Schools andHow They Got
That Way
As with all school finance equity litigation, Pauley was born of parents'
outrage about the poor quality of their children's schools-in this case, the
schools of Lincoln County, West Virginia. The Supreme Court of Appeals'
Pauley opinion kept its description of the facts brief, though it did characterize
the schools as "woefully inadequate,"" and it recited the trial court's factual
findings in a footnote.45 In his opinion on remand, Judge Recht provided more
detail. Commenting on the school facilities in Lincoln County, he wrote:
Conditions at many of the facilities in Lincoln County pose an
immediate and serious health hazard. Two schools should be
closed immediately and most others need substantial repair to
meet state health standards. The water supply at many schools
is unhealthful . . .. At two schools, sewage disposal systems are
periodically saturated and sewage surfaces. At another school,
untreated sewage discharges into a stream. At most schools in
the county, water pools are in the playground area, roofs leak,
ceilings are in poor repair, floors are worn, and lighting is
inadequate. These conditions threaten the health and safety of
students in Lincoln County and adversely affect the ability of
students to concentrate in school.46
Janet Pauley had moved to Lincoln County from Chicago in 1971. She later
described her experiences at her first Lincoln County PTA meeting: "So I went
down to the meeting, and I happened to look and the seats were broken in the
school. You couldn't even sit down. I bet there were 21 windows broken out in
that school. And, most of all, the smell. Oh, you couldn't stand it."47 Pauley
reported that when she asked about the smell, the elementary school principal
responded, "It's the sewer out there," and pointed to a stream of wastewater
running through a play area at the back of the school.48

"

Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 878 (W. Va. 1979).

45
46

Id. at 862 n.4.
Pauley v. Bailey (Recht Decision), No. 75-1268, slip op. at 144
(Kanawha Cty. Cir. Ct.,

May 11, 1982).
47
OF

BETH SPENCE, CHALLENGE WV, WHATEVER HAPPENED TO PAULEY
V. BAILEY? THE STORY
THE
POLITICS
OF
EDUCATION
IN
WEST
VIRGINIA!
2
(1998),

https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED426839.pdf
48

Id.
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Poor facilities were not the only problem. Linda Martin, a parent who
transferred her children from Kanawha County into the Lincoln County schools,
described the change:
It blew my mind to see the difference between Kanawha County
schools and the ones [in Lincoln County]. I couldn't believe the
conditions: 47 kids in a classroom, ten-year-old textbooks, no
written curricula, unqualified teachers, blatant discrimination
against poor kids.. . The county ranked 54th out of 55 in the
state in basic skills test scores. My husband [a high-school
science teacher in Lincoln County] found that half his ninth
graders couldn't read.49
Nor were the facilities issues and the classroom problems unconnected: "The
School Board was putting all of its resources into buildings and administrators
instead of putting most of them into the classroom," Martin added.
To understand the problems Lincoln County faced, one has to reach back
to the Tax Limitation Amendment of 1932, which amended Article X, § 1 of the
West Virginia Constitution. The original version of the section had simply called
for "equal and uniform" taxation,5 ' but the 1932 Amendment divided property
into four classes and set relatively low rate ceilings for ad valorem taxes on each
class of property. 52 As Professor Bastress explains, the Amendment's purpose
was to reduce the tax burden for farmers and homeowners at the expense of
industrial and commercial interests. Yet because local governments raise
revenues primarily through property taxes, the low rates put serious strain on
local government budgets. Professor Bastress notes that the property tax
limitations "had the effect of shifting the support of public schools and
more
governmental services away from reliance on property taxes and toward 53
progressive taxes-especially the income tax-imposed at the state level."

49

Id. at 9.

50

Id.

See ROBERT M. BASTRESS, JR., THE WEST VIRGINIA STATE CONSTITUTION 284 (2d ed. 2016)
[hereinafter BASTRESS, CONSTITUTION].
The four classes of property and their respective rates are Class I (personal property), Class
52
II (residential and agricultural property), Class II (other property-i.e. commercial and industrial
property, located outside municipalities), and Class IV (other property located inside
municipalities). The maximum rates are stepped up in $0.50 increments from $.50 per $100 dollars
of assessed value for Class I property up to $2.00 per $100 of assessed value for Class IV property.
(Later constitutional amendments reduced the government's ability to levy taxes on most kinds of
personal property, thus reducing the importance of Class I property in the financing of public
education.) These tax ceilings apply to the sum of all levied property taxes. The legislature sets the
maximum rates for each class of property for each of the authorized levying bodies.
BASTRESS, CONSTITUTION, supra note 51, at 285.
s3
5'
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Because property taxes are regressive as compared to income taxes 5 4 and
because shifting school funding to the state generally increases equity across
districts," the consequences of the Tax Limitation Amendment might seem
positive, and perhaps they would have been had the state taken upon itself the
entire burden of education financing. This, however, did not happen. Instead, the
school funding structure that existed at the start of the Pauley litigation-and, in
modified form, today-makes local property taxes an important part of school
funding. West Virginia's Public School Support Plan (a.k.a. the school funding
formula) calculates the resources needed by each county school district in seven
specified categories in order to arrive at the "basic foundation program." 5 6
Funding for the basic foundation program is split between the state and
counties/school districts.57 The county's "local share" is a function of its "regular
levy," i.e. property taxes collected on county real property across all districts at
a uniform rate determined by the legislature." The state supplies the difference
between the basic foundation program amount and the local share. As the regular
levy rates on the different classes of real property are the same for all districts,
the size of the local share contribution is a function of district property wealth.
Property-rich districts contribute a greater portion of their basic foundation
support than property-poor ones. The school funding formula, then, actively
seeks to equalize educational funding such that the resources supporting a given
child's education are not determined by the property wealth of her district.5 9
State aid and local share, however, are not the whole story. The West
Virginia Constitution and implementing statutes allow counties to approve an
54

Id. (citing Killen v. Logan Cty. Comm'n, 295 S.E.2d 689, 712-13 (W.
Va. 1982) (Neely, J.,

dissenting)).

See RYAN, FIVE MILES AWAY, supra note 28, at 128-29.
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 18-9A-1 (West 2019). For a summary of the
Public School Support
Program, see WEST VIRGINIA DEP'T. OF EDUC., SOURCEBOOK 2015 25-26 (2015),
https://wvde.state.wv.us/finance/sourcebooks/20 15 -source-book.pdf.
5
Since 1933 legislation, each of West Virginia's 55 counties constitutes one
school district.
See BASTRESS, CONSTITUTION, supranote 51, at 331.
58
The statutory maximum rate for county boards of education is 22.95 cents
per one hundred
dollars of assessed property valuation for Class I property. W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 11-8-6c(1)-(3)
(West 2019) (adding rates in (l-(3) for total figure of 22.95 cents). The maximum statutory rate
for Class II property is twice this base rate, and the rate for Class III and IV property is four times
the base rate. Id. As applying the same rate to Class III and Class IV seems plainly inconsistent
with the constitutional text, see W. VA. CONST. art. X, §1, this feature of the school finance code
is somewhat mysterious.
5

56

Because West Virginia law prohibits total state property tax revenues from increasing more than
two percent from year to year, W. VA. CODE ANN. § 11-8-6f (West 2019), the regular levy rate is
usually set at some level slightly below the statutory maximum. In recent years, the rate for Class
I property has been 19.40 cents per one hundred dollars of assessed valuation. See WEST VIRGINIA
DEP'T. OF EDUC., SOURCEBOOK 2015, supra note 56, at 3.
5
For this reason, the Pauley court rejected any facial challenge to the
state's foundation

formula. See Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 879 (W. Va. 1979).
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"excess levy" that can double the maximum tax rates for the various classes of
district property.o School excess levies must be approved by a majority of
county voters and are valid for up to five years. The proceeds from excess levies
are not included within the state financing formula, and so differences in the
property tax bases of different districts can produce dramatically different levels
of excess levy revenue. Further, the political feasibility of passing excess levies
is not uniform across districts, and at most times ten or more West Virginia
districts have no excess levy in effect.6 ' As Professor Bastress has explained, the
excess levy system disadvantages the state's rural counties:
First, those counties have less expensive housing, the terrain is
more mountainous and less "useable," and communities are (by
definition) more isolated-all of which contribute to lower
property values and, thus, a lower tax base. Second, rural
counties have less Class IV property-that is, commercial and
industrial property, which can be taxed at twice the rate of
residential and farm property. That too, makes for a lower tax
base, and it also means that any increases in taxes or excess
levies would have to be disproportionately borne by individuals
(i.e., voters), rather than businesses. Unemployment, poverty,
and free and reduced school lunch rates all run higher in West
Virginia's rural counties than in its more populous areas, and the
rural populations tend to be older and are diminishing. As a
consequence of those factors, the sparsely populated counties
encounter a much more difficult time passing bonds and excess
62
levies to supplement their budgets.
When the Pauley case began, Lincoln County had consistently passed
63
excess levies at the maximum allowable rates for the prior two decades, but its
relatively low tax base limited the amount of revenue these excess levies
generated. The state foundation program was not enough on its own to
adequately support the schools, so the need to rely on the excess levy led to the
conditions that so appalled Janet Pauley and Linda Martin. The Pauleys decided
to do something about the Lincoln County schools. With the aid of Dan Hedges,
then a young lawyer at the Appalachian Research and Defense Fund, they filed
suit in the Kanawha County Circuit Court in 1975. The lead defendant was John
Kelly, at that time the State Treasurer.
60

61

§ 10.
In 2015, 43 of 55 districts had excess levies in effect, and 22 of those 43 set their rates at

W. VA. CONST. art. X,

the statutory maximum. WEST VIRGINIA DEP'T. OF EDUC., SOURCEBOOK 2015, supra note 56, at 4.

Robert M. Bastress, Jr., The Impact ofLitigation on Rural Students: From Free Textbooks
to School Consolidation, 82 NEB. L. REv. 9, 36-37 (2003) [hereinafter Bastress, The Impact of
Litigation].
63
Pauley v. Bailey (Recht Decision), No. 75-1268, slip op. at 153 (Kanawha Cty. Cir. Ct.,
May 11, 1982).
62
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The Pauley plaintiffs, like those in other school finance challenges,
argued to the trial court that West Virginia's financing structure deprived
students in property-poor counties like Lincoln of both the equal protection of
the laws' and their right to be educated in a "thorough and efficient system of
free schools" under Article XII, Section 1 of the West Virginia Constitution.
Although the circuit court agreed that students in Lincoln County were not
receiving a "thorough and efficient" education and made a number of factual
findings that supported the Pauleys' claims, the court granted the defendants'
motion to dismiss in 1977. It reasoned that the state equal protection claim failed
for the same reasons given in Rodriguez: there was no suspect classification
because there was no correlation between poor children and property-poor
districts. While the court agreed that the Lincoln County schools were not
delivering a thorough and efficient education, it ruled that the plaintiffs had failed
to show that the school financing system had caused the sorry state of the Lincoln
County schools.65
III. THEPAULEYOPINION
When the Supreme Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Pauley v. Kelly
on February 20, 1979, this last part of the trial court ruling provided a ready
ground for reversal. Perhaps the plaintiffs had not convinced the trial court that
the school financing system was the cause of the problems in the Lincoln County
schools, but that was a question of material fact, not a shortcoming in the
plaintiffs' legal theory.66 Writing for the court, Justice Harshbarger quickly
concluded that a remand was necessary. But he did not stop there. 67 Recognizing
the significance of the case, he offered guidance for the circuit court to follow on
remand by analyzing the relevant constitutional provisions and identifying areas
that would require further evidentiary development.
After expressing some initial concern that an equal protection approach
might deprive the state of needed flexibility, the court turned to a detailed
examination of West Virginia's Education Clause, which states: "The legislature
shall provide, by general law, for a thorough and efficient system of free

64
The West Virginia Constitution does not contain an explicit equal protection clause,
but it
has been construed to contain equal protection principles by implication of the Due Process Clause
in Article III, § 10. See Israel v. W. Va. Secondary Schs. Activities Comm'n, 388 S.E.2d. 480 (W.
Va. 1989).
65
This is the report of the Supreme Court of Appeals. Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d
859, 863
(W. Va. 1979). The trial court's factual finding (i) as quoted at 862 n.4 of Pauley seems to imply
a causal relationship, however, so the characterization is a bit puzzling. Suffice it to say that
whatever the trial court's precise reasoning, the court apparently combined sympathy for plaintiffs'
factual claims with rejection of their legal arguments.
66
Id. at 863.
67
If he had, we probably would not be remembering Pauley's 40th anniversary.
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schools." The "thorough and efficient" language is a common quality standard
in state education clauses, so the court did not have to do its interpretive work in
a vacuum. It launched into a systematic examination of constitutional debates (in
West Virginia and Ohio, mostly) preceding the adoption of "thorough and
efficient" clauses, case law from other states interpreting such clauses, and
finally dictionary definitions. Yet before the court could address what "thorough
and efficient" means, it needed to explain why it had the authority to decide what
"thorough and efficient" means and to judge the legislature's conformity to that
standard.
The Education Clause, after all, says that "the legislature shall
69
provide . . . for a thorough and efficient system of free schools." All courts have
read such language to conclude that the legislature must have some discretion in
performing its constitutional duties, and some courts have read it to imply that
the meaning of a state education clause is a "political question," i.e. a question
where the legislature and not the judiciary has the last word regarding
constitutional meaning. 70 Justice Neely reached just this conclusion in his Pauley
72
dissent,7 ' and prima facie there is a plausible case that Baker v. Carr's key
criteria for political questions are met: the language arguably suggests a
"textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department," 73 and there may also be "a lack of judicially discoverable
and manageable standards."74 How are courts to decide when schools are good
enough to meet the thorough and efficient standard?
Proceeding cautiously on this threshold question of judicial
enforceability, Justice Harshbarger began by emphasizing the points agreed upon
by all the courts that had considered "thorough and efficient" clauses: First, these
clauses impose real legal duties-they are not merely hortatory. Second, these
duties fall on the state, and they may not be escaped through delegation to local
governments. Third, courts have acknowledged that the legislature must have
broad discretion and perhaps even "plenary power" in deciding when the
5
thorough and efficient mandate has been fulfilled. Indeed, the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals had itself said in 1871 that the legislature is "to judge
of the thoroughness and efficiency."7 6

68
69
70

n1
72

n
74
7
76

W. VA. CONST. art. XII, § I.
Id. (emphasis added).
See, e.g., Comm. for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178 (111. 1996).
Pauley, 255 S.E.2d at 897-900 (Neely, J., dissenting).
369 U.S. 186 (1962).
Id. at 217.
Id.
Pauley, 255 S.E.2d at 869.
Id. at 870 (quoting Kuhn v. Bd. of Educ. of Wellsburg, 4 W. Va. 499, 509 (1871)).
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And yet, one must pay attention not just to what courts say, but also to
what they do. As the court put it:
We need not reflect upon the conundrum presented by these
several cases that the judiciary, bowing to legislative branches'
plenariness, hardly ever has refused to speak its approval or
disapproval of the legislatures' plenary acts. However, courts
have not stopped there. Nearly every one has intervened when
an act by a legislature or a proceeding by a local school board,
as agent of the legislature, is offensive to judicial notions about
what a thorough and efficient system of education is. 77
A fair point, and the court backed it up with examples. Plenary
legislative power over the public schools can coexist with some degree of
judicial review of compliance with the thorough and efficient mandate. Other
state courts had shown this.78
The Pauley court, however, never fully specifies the proper balance
between legislative deference and independent judgment in its vision of judicial
review. The court quotes cases from other jurisdictions that use a rational basis
standard, asking simply whether the legislature's educational program can be
seen as bearing a reasonable relationship to the educational goals mandated by
the state constitution.7 ' That relatively deferential standard was probably enough
to invalidate West Virginia's educational system at the time, and arguably this is
all the Pauley court really intended, but the court is never completely clear about
what the standard of review should be. Perhaps this was intentional. Professor
Koski has argued that courts may benefit strategically from adopting vague
standards, which provide the courts with the flexibility they may need to push
the legislature toward reform without threatening their own legitimacy.o
Whether intentional or not, the lack of clarity about the relative roles of the
legislature and the judiciary in defining the contours of a thorough and efficient
education would be an issue throughout the Pauley litigation.
Having decided that it had a (vaguely specified) role to play in policing
legislative compliance with West Virginia's Education Clause, the court then set
out to define the key terms in that clause: "thorough," "efficient," and
"education."

n7

Id. at 8 71.

78

Id. at 874 ("There is therefore ample authority that courts will enforce
constitutionally

mandated education quality standards.").
7
Id. at 869-70 (citing Malone v. Hayden, 197 A. 344 (Pa. 1938), for the proposition
that
"courts can only decide whether legislation has a reasonable relation to the thorough
and efficient
mandate").
80
William S. Koski, Of Fuzzy Standardsand Institutional Constraints:
A Re-Examination of
the JurisprudentialHistory of EducationalFinance Reform Litigation, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV.

1185, 1194, 1297-98 (2003) [hereinafter Koski, Fuzzy Standards].
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Drawing on dictionary definitions, accounts from other courts, and
legislative history, the court read the word "thorough" to set a high bar. A
thorough education is "absolutely complete, attentive to every detail, extending
82
1
beyond ordinary parameters."" It is "more than simply adequate or minimal."
The West Virginia Constitution's drafters wanted a high-quality education
system, for during the 1972 convention they rejected an amendment to add
"common" as a description of the schools the legislature is required to provide."
Significantly, the court noted that other courts had recognized equality as a
component of a school system's thoroughness and efficiency.84 In addition, the
court cited Dr. Ambler's commentaries for the proposition that "wealthy schools
situated among poor schools did not make a thorough and efficient system."8
The words "efficient" and "education" were defined using the same
methodology,86 leading to the court's definition of a thorough and efficient
system of schools: "It develops, as best the state of education expertise allows,
the minds, bodies and social morality of its charges to prepare them for useful
and happy occupations, recreation and citizenship, and does so economically."
Other courts had said things of this kind. For example, Robinson had
said that New Jersey's constitution required schools that would "equip a child
for his role as a citizen and as a competitor in the labor market."" Pauley,
however, read more into "thorough" than had the New Jersey Supreme Court.
"Thorough" didn't simply mean education sufficiently complete for political and
economic citizenship. In Pauley, it meant the educational state of the art-an
interpretation that Judge Recht would take very seriously on the remand. Further,

8a
82

Pauley, 255 S.E.2d at 874.
Id. at 875.

Id. at 876. This point initially seems unpersuasive, for the idea of "common schools" in the
83
nineteenth century signaled not a commitment to mediocrity, but a determination that students of
varied classes would be educated together. See, e.g., Molly O'Brien & Amanda Woodrum, The
Constitutional Common School, 51 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 581, 599 (2004). Yet as the framers of the
West Virginia Constitution obviously envisioned "common schools" in this sense, Justice
Harshbarger's inference that they took "common" to be setting too low a bar and struck it for that
reason is not implausible.
84

Pauley, 255 S.E.2d at 875.

85

Id. at 876.

The words "efficient" and "education" were defined mainly from dictionaries, with a few
references to case law. "Efficient," the court said, means "marked by ability to choose and use the
most effective and least wasteful means of doing a task or accomplishing a purpose." Id. at 874.
"Education" is "the development of mind, body, and social morality (ethics) to prepare persons for
useful and happy occupations, recreation, and citizenship." Id. at 877.
Id. at 877. The court's well-known "definition" is presented almost as an exercise in cutting
87
and pasting, as though the court were asking rhetorically, "Who can quarrel with dictionaries?"
The move from "thorough" to "as best the state of education expertise allows" is, however, more
86

significant than the court lets on.
88

Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 295 (N.J. 1973).
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Pauley was the first court to spell out in detail what capacities were needed for
citizenship, as well as the supports needed to develop those capacities:
Legally recognized elements in this definition are development
in every child to his or her capacity of (1) literacy; (2) ability to
add, subtract, multiply and divide numbers; (3) knowledge of
government to the extent that the child will be equipped as a
citizen to make informed choices among persons and issues that
affect his own governance; (4) self-knowledge and knowledge
of his or her total environment to allow the child to intelligently
choose life work to know his or her options; (5) work-training
and advanced academic training as the child may intelligently
choose; (6) recreational pursuits; (7) interests in all creative arts,
such as music, theatre, literature, and the visual arts; (8) social
ethics, both behavioral and abstract, to facilitate compatibility
with others in this society.
Implicit are supportive services: (1) good physical facilities,
instructional materials and personnel; (2) careful state and local
supervision to prevent waste and to monitor pupil, teacher and
administrative competency.89
By defining a thorough and efficient education so specifically, the court
made clear that its words were not merely aspirational. The standard would have
teeth. Indeed, the court strikingly noted that on remand expert testimony would
be needed because "[m]ere rote comparison [of systems like Lincoln County's]
with other more affluent counties does not necessarily serve to define the values
of a [thorough and efficient school] system.""o In other words, experts might
convince the trial court on remand that none of West Virginia's schools were
"thorough and efficient" because none reflected the educational state of the art.
These aspects of the Pauley opinion are remarkable. Though Pauley was
laudably ambitious in its goals, one can also understand why critics (including
Justice Neely) claimed that the court had forgotten its place.9 1 The tone here
suggests that courts, guided by the opinion of educational experts, will decide for
themselves what constitutes a constitutionally adequate education: de novo
review. And yet-the very next sentence strikes a different, and seemingly more
deferential, note: "[W]e emphasize that great weight will be given to legislatively
established standards, because the people have reposed in that department of
government 'plenary, if not absolute' authority and responsibility for the school

89

Pauley, 255 S.E.2d at 877.

90

Id. at 878.

91

Id. at 899 (Neely, J., dissenting) ("I have my own ideas of what constitutes
'thorough and
efficient' education; nonetheless, I am constitutionally constrained not to force them down the
throats of other equally well-informed persons who have different values merely because I am a

judge.").
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system." 9 2 Is the judge's role to decide what constitutes a thorough and efficient
education, or is it merely to force the legislature to decide that question and then
93
to police the legislature's compliance with its own definition? Pauley never
fully resolves this question.
Having devoted most of the constitutional analysis to the Education
Clause, Justice Harshbarger finished by concluding that both equal protection
and the "thorough and efficient" standard could be "harmoniously" applied to
94
West Virginia's school financing system. Although the opinion opened with
praise for Robinson's reluctance to adopt an equal protection approach, in the
end Pauley took the very step Robinson had declined. It declared that education
was a fundamental right in West Virginia and thus held that any discriminatory
classification in the school financing system must be reviewed under strict
scrutiny. 95 Perhaps the key difference from Robinson was that the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals had already made clear that education was special in
West Virginia. As Pauley put it, "Our basic law makes education's funding
second in priority only to payment of the State debt, and ahead of every other
State function. Our Constitution manifests, throughout, the people's clear
mandate to the Legislature, that public education is a Prime function of our State
government." 96 Robinson had worried that applying strict equal protection
scrutiny to local educational decisions would bleed over into extensive judicial
review of a wide range of local government decisions about the allocation of
limited resources.97 Pauley answered that in West Virginia, education had
already been singled out as distinctive, thereby limiting spillover effects.
The rest of the Pauley opinion outlined a variety of issues for the trial
98
court to explore on remand. Most notably for present purposes, the court stated
that excess levy revenues would not be subject to attack under West Virginia's
99
Equal Protection Clause. This observation was doubtless meant to provide
guidance to the trial court on remand, but what was the message? That the excess

92

Id. at 878.

The rhetorical question in the text is not meant to imply that these two ways of thinking
93
about judicial review are the only options.
94

Id.

95

Id.

96

Id. at 884.

See Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 283-87 (N.J. 1973).
For a concise summary of Pauley's directions to the circuit court, see Pauley v. Bailey, 324
98
S.E.2d 128, 130 (W. Va. 1984).
The court's reasoning was unconvincing. It explained that equal protection principles apply
9
to legislative action, whereas "excess levies are determined by the vote of the people." Pauley, 255
S.E.2d at 880. Yet the legal structure that makes it possible for voters to approve excess levies is
itself state action, so this explanation makes little sense. The court's later decision in Board of
Education v. Chafin, 376 S.E.2d 113, 118-20 (W. Va. 1988), provided better reasons for treating
the excess levy as constitutionally untouchable. See infra notes 196-199 and accompanying text.
9
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levy may not be challenged on equal protection grounds does not mean that it
may not be challenged on other grounds. Indeed, the court went on to say that
while excess levies might be considered in determining whether the state had
provided financial resources sufficient to underwrite a thorough and efficient
educational system, their role had to be limited because the primary
responsibility to assure constitutional compliance rested on the state.
Accordingly, the Pauley opinion appeared to leave sufficient room for a
constitutional challenge to the excess levy under West Virginia's Education
Clause.
IV. PAULEY AND THE WAVES OF SCHOOL FINANCE LITIGATION

The Pauley opinion, then, established a demanding and unusually
detailed conception of the legislature's duties under the Education Clause. In
addition, it ruled that education was a fundamental right in West Virginia and
thus subjected classifications affecting education to strict scrutiny. It treated
equal protection and Education Clause standards as harmonious and as judicially
enforceable, though the court seemed to speak in multiple voices on the question
of how stringent judicial review would be.
Before proceeding to the next stage of Pauley's story, I want to situate
the Pauley opinion within the broader history of school finance litigation. The
standard account-now generally recognized as inaccurate in some respects, yet
still a useful starting point-divides this history into "waves.""oo In sketching the
"waves" account, my primary goal is to suggest that Pauley cannot be fit neatly
into that account. Instead, Pauley anticipates all the reasons why the waves
account, though quite useful in its day, seems oversimplified in hindsight.
In the standard story, Rodriguez marks the end of the first-wave cases
based on the federal Equal Protection Clause."o' The dividing line between the
second and third wave cases is 1989, and the critical difference between the two
eras is said to be that the second wave pursued educational equity, while the third
wave (more successfully) focused on educational adequacy.102
Second-wave cases-from Robinson in 1973 to 1989-are said to have
made essentially the same arguments that had been rejected in Rodriguez, but
under state rather than federal equal protection law. While some second-wave
cases, notably the California Supreme Court's 1976 decision in Serrano v. Priest

i0
See, e.g., Enrich, supra note 2; William E. Thro, The Third Wave: The Implications of
the
Montana, Kentucky, and Texas Decisions on the Future of Public School Finance Reform
Litigation, 19 J.L. & EDUC. 219 (1990). Professor Thro's 1990 article appears to be the first to
describe school finance litigation as consisting of three waves.
10
See William E. Thro, JudicialAnalysis Duringthe Third Wave ofSchool
FinanceLitigation:
The MassachusettsDecision as a Model, 35 B.C. L. REV. 597, 600 (1994).
102

Id. at 601-04.
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(Serrano1),103 do fit the ideal type of a second-wave case quite closely, otherslike Pauley-do not. School reformers won some victories in second-wave
litigation, but the majority of courts during this period rejected school finance
equity challenges.10 4
Reformers scored a number of victories in the period from 1989 to 1993,
starting with the Kentucky Supreme Court's decision in Rose v. Council for
Better Education in 1989.0 Seeking to explain this change of fortune in school
finance litigation, scholars pointed to Rose as the archetype for a new type of
school finance lawsuit--one based not on a right to equalfunding, but on a right
to an adequate education guaranteed by the Education Clauses in state
constitutions.10 6 The Rose court considered Kentucky's Education Clause, which
reads: "The General Assembly shall, by appropriate legislation, provide for an
0 7
Rose read this
efficient system of common schools throughout the State."
for
opportunity
equal
an
"provide[]
must
language to mean that the legislature
an
that
specified
court
the
Further,
education."'
children to have an adequate
adequate education must aim at providing
each and every child with at least the seven following capacities:
(i) sufficient oral and written communication skills to enable
students to function in a complex and rapidly changing
civilization; (ii) sufficient knowledge of economic, social, and
political systems to enable the student to make informed
choices; (iii) sufficient understanding of governmental
processes to enable the student to understand the issues that
affect his or her community, state, and nation; (iv) sufficient
self-knowledge and knowledge of his or her mental and physical
wellness; (v) sufficient grounding in the arts to enable each
student to appreciate his or her cultural and historical heritage;
(vi) sufficient training or preparation for advanced training in
either academic or vocational fields so as to enable each child to
choose and pursue life work intelligently; and (vii) sufficient
levels of academic or vocational skills to enable public school
students to compete favorably with their counterparts in
09
surrounding states, in academics or in the job market.'

103

557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976).

See Koski, Fuzzy Standards, supra note 80, at 1242 (stating that between Robinson in 1973
1'
and the end of 1988, plaintiffs won only 5 of 20 school finance reform lawsuits decided in state
supreme courts).

1os

790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989).

106

See Koski, Fuzzy Standards, supra note 80, at 1251.

107

Ky. CONST. § 183.

1os

Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 211.

109

Id. at 212.
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In the standard account, Rose's emphasis on adequacy is critical to the
case's success.i1 0 Aiming at equality under equal protection principles, it is said,
makes it too difficult for courts to accept the arguments of school reformers. One
problem confronted by any equality theory is to answer the question: equality of
what? Should courts look to equal per student spending (i.e. horizontal equity),
equal resources (i.e. educational inputs), equal opportunities to learn relative to
student need (i.e. vertical equity), or fiscal neutrality (i.e. the principle that equal
tax effort should yield equal dollars, regardless of variations in local property
wealth)?.'. These questions have no easy answers. More significantly, equality
theories confront formidable political obstacles. Schools will never be fully
equal, and to move them toward equality requires either leveling up or leveling
down. A pure leveling-up strategy would require giving every school district the
level of resources enjoyed by the wealthiest districts and so carries a price tag
too high for most voters. Yet anything less requires the leveling down of at least
some districts, with the degree of leveling depending on the baseline chosen as
the benchmark for equality.' 12 Wealthier districts typically have outsized
political influence, and thus the political costs of any leveling-down strategy are
high.113 These dynamics, it is thought, help to explain the relatively limited
success of second-wave litigation.
Rose seemed to offer a way out. Courts could require legislatures to level
up school funding to the benchmark needed for an adequate education without
requiring any districts to level down. Of course, there was still a need to set the
level of adequacy by striking an appropriate balance between pedagogical
ambition and cost. But courts could leave that balance to the legislature in the
first instance, just as the Rose court did.114 When seen in this light, the Rose
court's fairly detailed (and ambitious) definition of educational adequacy laid the
groundwork for judicial review in case the legislature responded by aiming at a
level of educational attainment the court was unwilling to see as "adequate." This
made sense in theory, and in fact it appeared to work like a charm. Within a year
See generally Enrich, supra note 2 (discussing the reasons why courts
may be more
sympathetic to adequacy than to equity theories).
I
See RYAN, FIVE MILES AWAY, supra note 28, at 130-35 (discussing various theories
of
equality advanced in early school finance litigation).
112
Realistic equality advocates might aim for a resources benchmark that falls
between the best
and worst funded schools in order to avoid the sticker shock of a pure leveling-up strategy. Yet
any compromise benchmark will require some leveling down of the wealthiest districts.
Consequently, efforts to appeal to some constituencies by reducing the overall cost of an equality
strategy will predictably alienate powerful constituencies who do not want to see their schools
"leveled down."
"3
See Michael Heise, State Constitutions, School FinanceLitigation, and the "Third
Wave
From Equity to Adequacy, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1151, 1174-76 (1995); Ryan, Schools, Race, and
Money, supra note 29, at 268-71.
114
Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 212 ("We do not instruct the General Assembly to enact
any specific
110

legislation . . . It is their decision how best to achieve efficiency.").
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after Rose was handed down, Kentucky had passed a comprehensive educational
reform statute that substantially increased educational funding."' With the
benefit of hindsight, it seems apparent that Rose's transformative effects had
more to do with a pre-existing consensus about the need for education reform
among Kentucky elites than with the court's legal analysis,"' but it's hard to
argue with success, and Rose became the bellwether "third wave" case.
To briefly finish out the standard account: third-wave cases have, on the
whole, enjoyed more success than second-wave cases, but results remain mixed
as school finance litigation enters its sixth decade. New cases continue to be
brought,"'7 and even where state law seems relatively settled, stunning reversals
sometimes occur."' Some suggest that we have now entered-or need to entera "fourth wave" of school reform litigation that pursues a more comprehensive
menu of remedies including racial and/or socioeconomic integration, preschool
119
programs, literacy programs, school choice, and teacher-tenure reform.
In this standard "waves" narrative, Pauley plays a minor role as one of a
20
handful of second-wave plaintiff victories based on an equity theory,' a mere
2
"see also" cite to supplement descriptions of cases like Robinson v. Cahill,'
22 and Serrano v. Priest (Serrano II).123 While Rose is
Horton v. Meskill,'
uniformly treated as a case of first-order significance, most commentators have
24
paid little attention to Rose's obvious debt to Pauley.'
The "waves" account has proved useful in many respects, and that I have
felt the need to sketch it is a testament to its continuing authority. But the account

115
116

See Werner, supra note 13, at 65-66.
See Koski, Fuzzy Standards, supra note 80, at 1270-73.

See, e.g., Delawareans for Educ. Opportunity v. Carney, 199 A.3d 109 (Del. Ch. 2018).
See Abbeville Cty. Sch. Dist. v. South Carolina, No. 2007-065159 (S.C. 2017)
(relinquishing jurisdiction on separation of powers grounds only three years after a differently
constituted court had ruled at 767 S.E.2d 157 (S.C. 2014) that the state's school financing system
violated South Carolina's Education Clause); William Penn Sch. Dist. v. Pennsylvania Dep't. of
Educ., 170 A.3d 414, 457 (Pa. 2017) (ruling that school financing challenges are justiciable despite
long-standing Pennsylvania precedents that had treated these challenges as political questions).
See Joshua E. Weishart, Aligning Education Rights and Remedies, 27 KAN. J.L. & PUB.
Il9
POL'Y 346, 354-59 (2018) [hereinafter Weishart, Aligning] (reviewing fourth-wave litigation);
William S. Koski, Beyond Dollars? The Promises and Pitfalls of the Next Generation of
EducationalRights Litigation, 117 COLUM. L. REv. 1897, 1915-30 (2017) (same, though using the
term "next generation" rather than "fourth wave").
120
See, e.g., William E. Thro, A New Approach to State ConstitutionalAnalysis in School
Finance Litigation, 14 J.L. &POL. 525, 529 n.14 (1998) (listing Pauley in a footnote as a secondwave equal protection case).
121
303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973).
122
376 A.2d 359 (Conn. 1977).
123
557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976).
For an exception, see Koski, Fuzzy Standards, supra note 80, at 1249-52 (explaining that
124
Pauleyused an adequacy analysis ten years prior to Rose, even if Pauley did not use the word).
117
118
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was first formulated in the early years of the third wave, and historical
perspective has now made clear that the account exaggerates the division
between second-wave equity cases and third-wave adequacy cases. Professor
Koski questioned this division in 2003,125 and Professor Ryan in 2008 pointed
out that even when courts say they are doing a stand-alone adequacy analysis,
they actually pay considerable attention to comparing the resources of different
districts.126 While the point can be developed with great theoretical
sophistication, 12 7 the idea that equity and adequacy are each incomplete on their
own is fairly intuitive. An emphasis solely on equity would bless a regime in
which all students receive an equally poor education-hardly an attractive
prescription, and it is difficult to believe that this was the result the framers of
state education clauses intended. The value of adequacy as a standard depends in
part, of course, on where the bar is set. But even assuming the adequacy bar is
set at a reasonable height, an understanding of educational adequacy with no
comparative dimension is still problematic. As the point is often put, education
is a "positional good."l2 8 Its value depends in part on how much education others
have, so if the goal of education is to prepare students to meaningfully participate
in social and economic life, we cannot know what sort of education is adequate
without knowing what level of education others are receiving. In other words,
education is functionally "adequate" only if sufficiently equal.1 29 The
interdependence of equity and adequacy is confirmed if we consider the role of
public education in legitimizing social inequality. It is, more than anything else,
the principle that every child is entitled to a free public education of acceptable
quality that explains why we regard the economic "race" in our society as
sufficiently fair that we can accept its outcomes as legitimate.130 For these
reasons, it is a mistake to proceed as though equity and adequacy are mutually
exclusive. Rather, courts can and should require that education be both "equally
adequate" and "adequately equal."l 3
The conventional "waves" account obscures these points generally, as
has now been widely appreciated. 13 2 My particular concern here, however, is
Id. at 1187-88.
James E. Ryan, Standards, Testing, and School FinanceLitigation,
86 TEx. L. REv. 1223,
1232-38 (2008) [hereinafter Ryan, Standardsand Testing].
127
See generally Weishart, Transcending,supra note 2.
128
See Koski & Reich, supra note 7, at 597-604.
129
See Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 94-95 (Wash. 1978)
(en banc) (stating
that the constitutional right to education "would be hollow indeed if the possessor of the right could
not compete adequately in our open political system, in the labor market, or in the market place of
ideas").
130
See Koski & Reich, supra note 7, at 608, 611.
131
Weishart, Transcending,supra note 2, at 483.
132
See id at 479 (describing "relatively recent" trend to embrace
equality and adequacy
theories as complementary).
125

126
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with the way in which the conventional narrative slights Pauley's contributions
to the law. To see Pauley as a plain vanilla second-wave equity case is not to
understand it at all. As will be clear from my prior discussion, the heart of the
Pauley opinion was its account of the qualitative standard imposed by West
Virginia's Education Clause. Indeed, nearly every feature of Rose's adequacy
33
analysis that has drawn praise was already present in Pauley,' even if Pauley
didn't use the word "adequacy" because it wanted to contrast a "thorough"
education with one that was merely "minimal." Yes, Pauley cared about equity
too, but so did Rose.134 In fact, both cases anticipate the belatedly emerging
scholarly consensus that equality and adequacy must be seen as interrelated
goods in the context of the right to education. Rose has gotten more attention
because it produced greater and more immediate political results than Pauley,
and there are lessons to be learned from that difference. But in conceptual terms,
Pauley got there first.135
Pauley saw that mere equality is not enough: "our thorough and efficient
constitutional mandate requires something more than a mere equality of
36
educational funding to the counties."l Nor is mere adequacy enough. One
problem with pure "adequacy" accounts-and likely the reason the Pauley court
never used the word-is the suggestion that the constitution merely sets a floor.
For example, the North Carolina Supreme Court has read that state's education
clause to require a "sound basic education,"13 a phrase the Pauley court would
never have used. A second problem is the suggestion that once all students have
a reasonable opportunity to reach the floor, the heights to which others might
climb are irrelevant. This eliminates the threat of leveling down and thus
heightens adequacy's political appeal, but as already explained, allowing too
much inequality undermines genuine adequacy because education is a positional
good. Pauley saw this too. Differential treatment in education must survive strict
scrutiny, so the distribution of educational opportunity in West Virginia must
meet both a quality standard and a distributional standard. The mandates of the

To be clear, the Kentucky Supreme Court acknowledged its debt to Pauley quite explicitly.
13
See Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186, 209-10 (Ky. 1989). It is the commentary
that has (mostly) slighted Pauley, not the Kentucky Supreme Court.
For example, Rose said that "[e]ach child, every child, in this Commonwealth must be
134
provided with an equal opportunity to have an adequate education. Equality is the key word here."
Id. at 211. In a similar vein, Rose emphasized state responsibility by explaining that local property
taxes "may not be used by the General Assembly as a substitute for providing an adequate, equal
and substantially uniform educational system throughout this state." Id. at 212.
Professor Weishart makes similar observations about Pauley and Rose in Weishart, Legacy,
35
supra note 2.
136

Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 882 (W. Va. 1979).

Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 255 (N.C. 1997). Further, some courts have rejected
equality claims by reasoning that equality of funding and educational opportunity is irrelevant so
long as all children are receiving a minimally adequate education. See Koski, Fuzzy Standards,
supra note 80, at 1262-64 (collecting cases).
137
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Equal Protection Clause and the Education Clause function "harmoniously" in
Pauley, and this is so in part because the "thorough and efficient" standard
includes elements of equality within itself.'
Pauley, then, was ahead of its time in seeking to harmonize equality and
quality in the right to education. This is not to say, however, that the Pauley court
had fully worked out the relationship between the two. 139 Its solution appeared
to involve setting the constitutional quality floor so high-so close to the ceiling,
if you will-that there would be little room for inequality to creep in. Who would
want more for their children than development of key capacities as best the state
of educational expertise would allow? But if that is Pauley's harmonization of
quality and equality, the solution brings problems of its own. As a practical
matter, this insistence on an exceptionally high quality floor has the same
problem as an equity approach that only levels up: extremely high cost. Further,
it may be naYve to think there is any upper bound on parental desires to obtain
educational advantages for their children. The well off understand that education
is a positional good at least as well as the poor, so the ceiling of educational
aspiration may rise at least as quickly as the floor of educational quality. It is
unclear what the Pauley court would have said about this last scenario, but the
court understood that any fully developed theory of the relationship between
educational quality and equality in West Virginia would have to tackle the excess
levy. Was the excess levy an affront to equal educational opportunity, or was it
instead a constitutionally protected way for some districts to secure educational
advantages for their own? Both the cost of Pauley'smandate and the excess levy
took center stage in the next phase of the Pauley story.

V. THE RECHT DECISION
The Pauley court knew just the man to handle the case in the circuit
court: Judge Arthur Recht. Judge Recht conducted a 40-day bench trial, which
exhaustively explored the agenda the Supreme Court of Appeals had laid out in
Pauley. Dan Hedges and his team assembled an impressive set of educational
experts, who testified at length about what an education consistent with the
current state of educational expertise would look like. Instead of putting forward
its own experts to advance a less ambitious vision of a thorough and efficient
education, the government aggressively cross-examined the Pauleys' witnesses

See supra text accompanying notes 84-85; cf Paul L. Tractenberg, Robinson
v. Cahill: The
"Thorough and Efficient" Clause, 38 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 312, 322 (1974) (explaining that
although the Robinson court failed to find a requirement of equal education in either federal or
state equal protection law, it nevertheless read an equality requirement into New Jersey's
Education Clause requiring a "thorough and efficient" education).
1
Cf Koski, Fuzzy Standards, supra note 80, at 1187-88, 1235-37 (suggesting
that secondwave courts often wove together equity and adequacy concerns in imprecise ways and illustrating
the point with respect to Robinson v. Cahill, an opinion that significantly influenced Pauley).
138
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and argued that the state's financing system was not the cause of Lincoln
County's problems.140
Given the evidence before the trial court, Judge Recht had little choice
but to take seriously Pauley's definition of a thorough and efficient education as
one that develops students' capacities "as best the state of education expertise
allows." 4 1 Just how seriously he took it became apparent on May 11, 1982, when
the trial court released the 244-page opinion now known as "the Recht Decision."
Judge Recht laid out specific standards for a thorough and efficient education in
extraordinary detail,1 4 2 then compared the West Virginia schools to those
standards and found them wanting. He concluded that no school system in the
state met all of the quality standards he laid out and that many systems (including
43
Lincoln County) met none. 1in case the matter was in any doubt, Judge Recht
characterized his decision as "no less than a call to the Legislature to completely
1
reconstruct the entire system of education in West Virginia."
Judge Recht explicitly found that the deficiencies in West Virginia
schools were a function of the school financing system, and he identified three
main culprits: the excess levy, the lack of an adequate state-level mechanism that
45
would assist property-poor counties in financing new school construction,1 and
a system of property appraisals in which much property was being assessed at a
146
The excess levies are my primary concern
fraction of actual market value.

140

Meckley, Bombshells, supra note 8, at 410 (describing the trial and characterizing the

government as arguing that "there are too many other mitigating variables such as nepotism,
inbreeding [sic], parental apathy, and political manipulation which are probably more related to
student achievement than level of funding"). I do not know whether Meckley's is a fair
characterization of the state's approach. (One hopes not.) What is clear is that the state did not
make any significant attempt to counter the Pauleys' experts through direct testimony and that
Judge Recht found that the state financing system was a significant cause of the problems in the
Lincoln County Schools. Pauley v. Bailey (Recht Decision), No. 75-1268 (Kanawha Cty. Cir. Ct.,
May 11, 1982), supplementedby No. 75-1268, slip op. at 7 (Kanawha Cty. Cir. Ct., May 22, 1982).
Pauley, 255 S.E.2d at 877.
To give just two examples, Judge Recht concluded that a thorough and efficient education
requires that every elementary student should receive 100 minutes of music instruction per week,
Recht Decision, slip op. at 52, and that the normal maximum ratio of 20 children per teacher in
early childhood education classes should be lower when the children come from isolated areas, id.
141
142

at 24-25.
143

Id. at 100, 219.

Id. at 234.
For more information on the creation of the School Building Authority and its impact in
145
encouraging school consolidation, see Bastress, The Impact ofLitigation, supra note 62, at 32-48;
Deirdre Purdy, Note, An Economical, Thorough and Efficient School System and the West Virginia
School BuildingAuthority "Economy ofScale" Numbers, 99 W.VA. L. REv. 175 (1996).
'"

146
While I do not have the space for a full discussion of property appraisal in West Virginia,
the story is fascinating, and Judge Recht's role in that story is arguably one of the Recht Decision's
more important legacies. To provide a thumbnail sketch: Judge Recht had identified the problem
of very low property appraisals, which deprived the schools of much needed revenue. Less than
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here, and Judge Recht was clear in holding that the state must provide funding
sufficient to finance a thorough and efficient system of education in every district
without reliance on the district's ability to pass an excess levy. 14 7
Many of the Recht Decision's key themes are present in the following
passage:
The state has a legal duty to provide equal educational
opportunities by allocating resources to counties according to
criteria substantially related to educational needs and costs. The
requirement of a thorough and efficient system of schools
imposes the same duty on the state. Since equality of substantive
educational offerings is guaranteed by the constitutional equal
protection guarantee, it is the resources (that is, the specific
inputs in terms of curriculum offerings, personnel, facilities and
materials and equipment, not the outcomes in terms of
achievement test scores) by which the constitutional adequacy
of the school system must be measured .... Differences in need
must be incorporated into the financing structure. The State has
a legal duty to insure that school systems with greater
educational needs and costs receive efficient educational
resources to meet those needs so that all children with similar
needs are treated equally and receive a quality education.14 8
This is a rich passage, but several points stand out. First, Judge Recht
hewed to Pauley's conception of a thorough and efficient system of schools as
marked by both quality and equality: the legal duty to provide equal educational
opportunity is also imposed the thorough and efficient standard. They are
harmonious. Second, Judge Recht stressed that the state must aim to allocate
resources in a manner tied to the needs of each school district. If financing criteria
are not related to student need, the state is not even aiming at the proper goal.
four months later, the Supreme Court of Appeals held that the West Virginia Constitution required
that all property be appraised at full market value. See Killen v. Logan Cty. Comm'n, 295 S.E.2d
689, 701 (W. Va. 1982). The public and Governor Rockefeller greeted Killen with outrage, and it
was quickly overruled by a constitutional amendment directing that property be assessed at 60%
of its appraised value. See W. VA. CONST. art. X, § lb (Property Tax Limitation and Homestead
Exemption Amendment of 1982); see also Meckley, Bombshells, supra note 8, at 413. Efforts to
implement consistent property assessment at the 60% level were unsuccessful for a time, see Jack
L. Flanigan, West Virginia'sFinancialDilemma: The Ideal School System in the Real World, 15
J. EDUC. FIN. 229, 234-36 (1989), but eventually bore fruit, see Amy Higginbotham, Property Tax
Assessment Procedure Changes Effect on School Resources and Student Performance, in 101
PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON TAXATION AND MINUTES OF THE ANNUAL MEETING
OF THE NATIONAL TAX ASSOCIATION 306, 306-308 (2008) (discussing the effects of the Appraisal

Act in 1990, which required that all property be assessed at 60% of its market value by 1994). As
Professor Higginbotham explains, improved property tax assessment practices generated increased
revenues for public education starting in the early 1990s. Id
147
148

See Recht Decision, slip op. at 221.
Id. at 218.
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49
Further, Judge Recht emphasized what scholars call "vertical equity."' Some
children face greater challenges, so greater resources may be needed to give those
children the thorough and efficient education they deserve.' Funding criteria
that do not acknowledge this point fail to allocate resources in a manner
"substantially related to educational needs and costs." Third, Judge Recht
understood equality and quality not in terms of dollars or test scores, but in terms
of education inputs: curriculum, personnel, facilities, etc. Money is important,
but the right to education is about more than money. The state constitution
demands that each child receive the resources she needs to have a fair opportunity
to attain a thorough and efficient education. As Judge Recht would later
explain,"' he framed the discussion in terms of educational inputs because all
52
the evidence put before him was framed in this way.'
Like Pauley, the Recht Decision set a high quality bar and embraced the
importance of equality as well. Judge Recht, however, had no choice but to
grapple with Pauley's uncertainties about the relationship between quality and
equality because he had to take a stand on the excess levy. If he read Pauley to
exempt the excess levy from constitutional scrutiny, Pauley was primarily a
quality/adequacy decision, albeit an exceedingly demanding one. Comparative
equality of resources could be a constitutional hope, but without some taming of
the excess levy, there could be no guarantee that educational opportunity would
be comparatively equal. If he read Pauley to mean that a thorough and efficient
education must be both equally adequate and adequately equal, the excess levy
had to be addressed. Judge Recht opted for the latter path.
Pauley had arguably left open the possibility that the excess levy violated
53
the Education Clause. On remand, Judge Recht held that it did.' Some of his
reasoning was an uncontroversial extension of Pauley: Education is a duty of the
state, and to make the provision of a thorough and efficient education dependent
on the ability of local districts to raise money through the excess levy is an
abdication of that duty-especially when property-poor districts cannot raise

149

See supra note 7 (defining vertical equity).

15o
See Recht Decision, slip op. at 218 ("Equal means that all factors contributing to differences
in curriculum needs and costs among counties; including concentrations of educationally
disadvantaged and culturally isolated students; differences in concentrations of children needing
services to address specific handicapping conditions ... . The State has a legal duty to insure that
school systems with greater educational needs and costs receive sufficient educational resources
to meet those needs so that all children with similar needs are treated equally and receive a high
quality education.").
'
Tomblin v. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ,, No. 75-1268, slip op. at 4 (Kanawha Cty. Cir.

Ct., Dec. 3, 2001).
152
Cf Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 295 (N.J. 1973) ("We deal with the problem [in terms
of dollar input per pupil] because dollar input is plainly relevant and because we have been shown
no other viable criterion for measuring compliance with the constitutional mandate.").
15

See Recht Decision, slip op. at 220-21.
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adequate funds even if they pass an excess levy.' 54 The argument is sound, but it
is still compatible with the view that districts may advantage their own students
via the excess levy so long as state funding assures that all districts can meet the
constitutional (and, for Judge Recht, very high) quality floor of educational
resources. Judge Recht went further in stating these conclusions of law:
33. The State has a legal duty to design a system of school
finance which eliminates all expenditure inequalities and
inadequacies resulting from the use of the excess levy to fund
public education.
34. Under no circumstances may the funding system rely on the
excess levy to raise more than an insignificant amount of
revenue for the public schools in any county. Any excess levy
so permitted must be fully equalized among counties so that any
given excess levy rate raises the same amount of revenues in
each county in which it is levied."I
Here we have a more direct emphasis on equality and a consequent
commitment to taming the excess levy by limiting the total amount of revenue it
could provide and requiring "fiscal neutrality," i.e. insuring that all districts with
the same excess levy rates will raise the same amount of revenue, regardless of
district property wealth. Perhaps more strikingly still, Judge Recht's conclusions
of fact tentatively endorsed suggestions from expert witnesses that the state
should discourage the use of excess levies by, e.g., including excess levies in the
calculation of a district's local share."' This approach would make it pointless
for districts to pass excess levies because each additional dollar raised would
result in one less dollar of state education funding.
These passages suggest that the Recht Decision declared war on the
excess levy. Others certainly read the decision that way, 5 7 as will become clear
in the pages that follow. For now, the critical point is that Judge Recht did so
because he gave Pauley's commitment to equality as much emphasis as its
commitment to high quality standards. And by understanding equality to require
the taming or elimination of the excess levy, Judge Recht embraced a key tenet
of the lawyers who fought the foundational battle for educational equality: school
desegregation. Eliminating the excess levy, like desegregation, was a classic

154

Id.

1ss

Id. at 225-26 (emphasis added).

156

Id. at 190-91.

1s7
The legislature acted on this understanding early on. While the Property Tax Limitation and
Homestead Exemption Amendment of 1982 was principally a response to the Killen decision, see
supra note 146, subsection E of the Amendment authorized a statewide excess levy if approved by
the voters. W. VA. CONST. art X, § 1(b)(E). Voter approval turned out to be difficult to obtain. See
infra notes 184-195 and accompanying text.
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tying strategy.' Just as desegregation meant that white parents could not gain
greater resources for their children without helping black children, parents in
property-rich districts would no longer be able to provide greater resources to
their own without helping students in property-poor districts as well. As
explained above, Pauley is often described as a second-wave equity casel9
description that does not fit both because Pauley emphasized equity and
adequacy and because, if anything, Pauley's commitment to adequacy/quality
was the deeper one. By taking on the excess levy, the Recht Decision made a full
commitment to both quality and equality.
In addition to fleshing out Pauley's substantive conception of the West
Virginia Constitution's right to education, Judge Recht also had to wrestle with
the vagueness in Pauley's conception of judicial review. His opinion often reads
as though he has resolved the tensions in Pauley by coming down firmly on the
side of de novo review: courts will decide what a thorough and efficient
60
education is, and the legislature must follow.' In context, however, the Recht
Decision reads this way in part because the court believed it was operating in a
vacuum regarding educational standards. Judge Recht lamented that while
Pauley had directed that legislative standards should be given "great weight,"
nothing the state had adopted or considered adopting at the time was
recognizable as an effort to articulate meaningful standards for a thorough and
efficient education. 161 In the absence of any legislative effort, the trial court
would make the first attempt to articulate real standards. Accordingly, Judge
Recht planned the appointment of a Commissioner to work with the legislature,
the executive branch, and other stakeholders to develop a "Master Plan" for
implementing the court's decision. The Plan would have to be extensive,
including "educational standards, resources to fund those standards, and public
taxation." 6 2 Yet if the legislature were to one day adopt meaningful standards,
perhaps those standards would be accorded "great weight" after all. Judge Recht

158

See RYAN, FIVE MILES AWAY, supranote 28, at 28:

The best and perhaps only way for blacks to receive an education equal to
whites was to attend the same schools. That way, white-dominated legislatures
and school officials could not benefit white students without also benefitting
black ones, or harm black students without also harming whites.
Desegregation, from this perspective, was not so much an end in itself as a
means to an end. It was a tying strategy, essentially, where black students
would tie their fates to white students because, as the saying went, green
follows white.
159
See supra notes 132-139 and accompanying text.
160
See, e.g., Recht Decision, slip op. at 216 ("Based on the extensive testimony and
documentary evidence presented in this case, this Court concludes as a matter of law that all
elements of the educational services and programs set out in [factual] findings 19 to 91 [which
describe the state of the art for various education programs] comprise the essential standards of a
thorough and efficient education.").
161
See id. at 92-99.
162

Id. at 235.
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agreed to wait sixty days before appointing a Commissioner in order to give the
State an opportunity to appeal.
In an extraordinary "Epilogue" to his opinion, Judge Recht candidly
described his doubts about the scope of judicial authority to demand wholesale
reform of West Virginia's public education system. After explaining his worries
that Judge Neely might have been right to conclude that the Pauley case did not
belong in the courts, Judge Recht wrote:
Slowly, however, as more witnesses testified and more exhibits
[were] considered, that original thought dissipated and gave way
to the realization of-if not the judicial branch of governmentthen who?
The other branches have over these many years [had] not only
the duty, but obviously the opportunity to have made the
standards set forth herein a reality .... However, as occasionally
occurs, despite the rather precise constitutional mandates, other
branches of government need the judicial direction to assist
them in discharging their oath. This is the genius written [into]
the concept of separation of power[s], and judicial review. 16 3
Though Judge Recht may well have been right that only the courts could goad
the political branches into serious educational reform, it is not hard to see how
passages like this one would prompt cries of judicial overreach. State Attorney
General Chauncey Browning described the Recht Decision as an "outrageous
intrusion into the legislative and executive branches of government," and House
Majority Leader Roger Tompkins added that the decision "specifically directs
the legislature to reconstruct the system of education in West Virginia and in
incredible detail purports to tell us exactly how."l64 Then there was the
anticipated cost of compliance, which was estimated to be as high as $1.6
billion. 165 Speaker Tompkins complained that Judge Recht's decision could
"wreck the state budget" and "increase property taxes 400 percent or more." 6 6 It
did not help that the decision came when the state was mired in recession and
struggled with the highest unemployment rate in the nation. '6 Summing up the
reactions to the Recht Decision, one out-of-state school finance expert remarked,

163

16
65

Id. at 238-39.
Meckley, Bombshells, supra note 8, at 412 (citations omitted).

Id. at 410.

66

Id. at. 412 (citation omitted).
167
See Roy Truby, Pauley v. Bailey and the West Virginia Master Plan, 65 PHI
DELTA KAPPAN
284, 284 (Dec. 1983). Governor Rockefeller initially opposed Judge Recht's ruling for this reason,
saying that the state "can't have more than we can reasonably expect people to pay for, particularly
when so many people aren't working." Helen M. Hazi, Co-Rechting West Virginia's Schools, 42
EDUc. LEADERSHIP 75, 76 (1985) (citation omitted).
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"They had a Yugo ... and maybe they should have had a Lumina. But what they
asked for was a Mercedes." 6 8
In response to the initial blowback, Judge Recht issued a supplemental
opinion on May 22, 1982-11 days after the initial decision-in which he
advanced a more chastened vision of the judicial role: "this Court cannot and
does not have the power-authority-or jurisdiction to DEMAND that the West
Virginia Legislature adopt this particular plan or for that matter, any single piece
of legislation."' 69 Instead, the envisaged Master Plan would merely be a set of
suggestions to the legislature that it might adopt if it wished. The court's role
could only be to assess whatever the legislature ultimately did and to compare
1 70
the legislative product with the standards set out in Pauley v. Kelly.
When the state decided not to appeal the Recht Decision, the trial court
granted a request by the State Superintendent of Schools and the Board of
Education to appoint a 99-member commission (instead of a single
17
commissioner) to develop a Master Plan. ' The Plan was submitted to Judge
Recht in December 1982,172 and he substantially approved it in an order dated
March 4, 1983.173 Significantly, the Master Plan accepted Judge Recht's
criticisms of the local excess levy and called for its replacement with a statewide
excess levy. 174 The March 4, 1983 order continued to send somewhat mixed
messages about the relative authority of the legislature and the courts by
describing the Master Plan as "a recommendation to the Legislature as an
example of a thorough and efficient system as defined in Pauley v. Kelly."' If
the legislature chose not to follow the Master Plan, the court would determine
whether its approach was a "good faith implementation of the governing
constitutional principles." 176 The latter statement seems consistent with a
common remedial approach in which courts "veto" the state's current
educational system, then leave the legislature some range of remedial options
77
that will in turn be vetoed or affirmed by the courts.' Yet the Master Plan was

Werner, supra note 13, at 75 (citation omitted).
169
Pauley v. Bailey (Recht Decision), No. 75-1268 (Kanawha Cty. Cir. Ct., May 11, 1982),
supplementedby No. 75-1268, slip op. at 9 (Kanawha Cty. Cir. Ct., May 22, 1982).
168

1o

Id.

Margaret D. Smith & Perry Zirkel, Pauley v. Kelly: School FinancesandFacilitiesin West
Virginia, 13 J. EDUC. FIN. 264, 270 (1988).
I72
Id.
Pauley v. Bailey, No. 75-1268 (Kanawha Cty. Cir. Ct., March 4, 1983).
173
1'

1

See id. at 4.
Id. at 3 (emphasis added).

76

Id. at 7.

174

177

See Koski, Fuzzy Standards,supra note 80, at 1241; see also Weishart, Aligning, supra note

119, at 348, 368. In one variant of this approach, courts merely veto the status quo without
providing any substantive guidance on how legislatures should fix the problems that rendered prior
legislative efforts unconstitutional. See Scott R. Bauries, Is There an Elephant in the Room?:
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unusually ambitious and specific. In this context, did "good faith" mean merely
the adoption of an approach that could be seen as reasonably related to the goals
set out in Pauley, or was "good faith" a signal that any deviation had to be as
fully satisfactory to the courts as the Master Plan itself?
In the end, the Recht Decision and Judge Recht's orders and
supplemental opinions in the following year retained some of Pauley's
vagueness about judicial review, but on the whole the message seems to be that
courts will extensively supervise the political branches' efforts to reconstruct
West Virginia's education system. Where Judge Recht's orders sound most
deferential," it is tempting to view them as efforts to maintain the courts'
legitimacy in deference to separation of powers concerns raised by the other
branches and the public."' But whether Judge Recht's notes of deference were
strategic or reflected genuine ambivalence, the Supreme Court of Appeals
seemed to dispense with deference when it addressed the Master Plan in late
1984. In Pauley v. Bailey,so that court rejected the Pauley plaintiffs' challenges
to the Master Plan calling for, among other things, a specific timetable for
implementation."' Although the court noted that the Master Plan itself was not
before the court for review, it nonetheless held that the Board of Education and
the State Superintendent of Schools had
a duty to ensure the complete executive delivery and
maintenance of a "thorough and efficient system of free
schools" in West Virginia as that system is embodied in A
MasterPlanfor Public Education which plan was proposed by
agencies of the executive branch and found constitutionally
acceptable by the Circuit Court of Kanawha County, and that
plan will be enforced until such time as it is altered or modified
by this Court or the circuit court.' 82
This formulation seemed to put the courts firmly in control of the
definition of a thorough and efficient education. One might object that the
Supreme Court of Appeals was merely holding the Board of Education to a
Master Plan that it largely developed, yet that plan was itself designed to satisfy
Judge Recht's criteria and required his approval. The Bailey court did not

JudicialReview ofEducationalAdequacy and the SeparationofPowers in State Constitutions, 61
ALA. L. REv. 701, 725-28 (2010) (describing this pattem as "remedial abstention").
See supra text accompanying notes 169-170.
Cf Koski, Fuzzy Standards, supranote 80 at 1190-91 (suggesting that because courts must
rely on the political branches to carry out education reform and face significant risks of
noncompliance, courts "preserve their own institutional legitimacy ... by only cautiously entering
the school finance fracas").
1

17

o80 324 S.E.2d 128 (W. Va. 1984).
18
See id. at 137.
182

Id. at 135.
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specifically endorse the Master Plan's and the Recht Decision's dim view of
local excess levies, but it also did nothing to distance itself from those views.
VI. EQUALITY TAKES A BACK SEAT: THE LOCAL EXCESS LEVY AND CHAFIN
I have now told the Pauley story from the beginning up through the
development of the Master Plan in a reasonable degree of detail, and I will also
pay considerable attention to Pauley's end in Part VII below. While I cannot
rehearse all the intervening stages in the story, it is essential to discuss the West
83
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals' decision in BoardofEducation v. Chafin'
as a crucial turning point. Whereas the Recht Decision had placed greater
emphasis on equality of resources than Pauley v. Kelly, Chafin pushed Pauley's
vision of the right to education in the opposite direction.
From the beginning of the Pauley litigation, it had been clear that state
reliance on local excess levies to fund schools was at the heart of the problems
faced by Lincoln County and other property-poor districts. The Recht Decision
had strongly criticized the local excess levy, and the Master Plan had called for
its replacement with a statewide excess levy. Now the challenge was to convince
the voters, who proved less persuadable than the courts had hoped.
In 1984, the legislature passed a constitutional amendment that would
18 4
have created a statewide excess levy system to replace local excess levies, but
it was easily defeated at the polls in November 1984.18 Some have attributed the
defeat to concerns that a statewide levy would redistribute school monies from
property-rich to property-poor counties.186 In other words, voters rejected the
idea of "leveling down," which is the political Achilles' heel of equality theories
of school finance reform. Two and a half months later, Judge Jerry W. Cook,
who presided over the Pauley case in mid-1980s, held a hearing on Dan Hedges's
motion for a court order implementing the Recht Decision.187 In December 1985,
Judge Cook issued an order decreeing that unless the legislature acted to replace
or equalize local excess levy revenues by July 1, 1987, the court would "order a
more equitable distribution of state aid to schools in conformity with [the Recht
Decision]."'
With Judge Cook's deadline approaching, the legislature made another
attempt to pass a statewide excess levy with the Uniform School Funding
Amendment,189 which was scheduled to go before the voters on March 5, 1988.
18
376 S.E.2d 113 (1988).
184
Better Schools, Roads, and Public Works Construction Amendment, S.J, Res. 4, 66th Leg.
(W. Va. 1984).
85
See Flanigan,supra note 146, at 234.
186
87

188
189

See Meckley & Hazi, supra note 6, at 340.
Pauley v. Gainer, No. 75-1268, slip op. at I (Kanawha Cty. Cir. Ct., Dec. 5, 1985).
Id. at 2.
H.J.R. 29, 68th Leg. (W. Va. 1987).
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On the day before his deadline, Judge Cook issued an order that extended the
deadline by one year in light of the pending vote on a statewide excess levy.' 90
While commending the legislature for its efforts, Judge Cook warned that if the
statewide levy amendment failed at the polls, the court would impose its own
solution to the excess levy problem on June 30, 1988. That solution was to fold
excess levy revenues into the local share calculation, phasing the new scheme in
over five years such that by the 1992-93 fiscal year, any county excess levy
revenues would be wholly included in the county's local share.1 91 Lest the
redistributive effects of this proposal were insufficiently clear, Judge Cook
explained that "[t]he corresponding increase in local share shall be distributed
among all the counties on an equitable basis to be prescribed by the Court." 92
Of course, under this system local politicians and voters would have no
reason to support local excess levies, and they would simply wither away. As
Judge Cook acknowledged, this might have perverse consequences: "This new
distribution of local shares leaves the possibility that certain school systems may
be injured in their capability to deliver a high quality education if new revenues
through reappraisal or from other sources prescribed by the Legislature are not
made available to the system." 9 3 In other words, the need to eliminate the
inequities of the excess levy was so great that equality must be pursued by
leveling down, even at the cost of the qualitative goals mandated by the
"thorough and efficient" standard.1 94
Whereas Pauley v. Kelly and Judge Recht had both sought a funding
regime that would balance the demands of quality and equality, Judge Cook's
order boldly declared that equality must prevail even at the cost of quality if the
statewide excess levy failed. Judge Cook obviously hoped his "harsh" solution
would not be needed-it was likely meant to be a threat akin to nuclear
deterrence. Yet threats do not always work. Voters again rejected the statewide
excess levy in March 1988,"' and the legislature failed to otherwise address the
excess levy problem by the trial court's June 30 deadline.
Unsurprisingly, the state tax commissioner, the state auditor, and thirtythree county boards of education filed suit to prevent the implementation of
Judge Cook's order. His remedy of folding the excess levy into the local share
calculation was leveling down, and leveling down is rarely popular. The
challengers' argument was simple: The school excess levy was part of the
190

191

Pauley v. Gainer, No. 75-1268 (Kanawha Cty. Cir. Ct., June
29, 1987).
See id. at 3-4.

192

Id. at 3.
Id. at 4. Judge Cook acknowledged that his solution had "the potential for
harsh results." Id.
194
Id. ("This Court recognizes that this redistribution addresses only the inequality issues. [The
Recht Decision of May 11, 1982] addressed not only an equitable system under the standard of
equal protection but also the State constitutional guarantee of a thorough and efficient education.")
19s
See Flanigan,supra note 146, at 240. For more information on the run-up to the
1988 vote
and a report of an interview with Judge Cook about his role in the Pauley case, see id. at 237-41.
193
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Constitution. Article 10, § 10 was added to the state constitution in 1958 through
passage of the Better Schools Amendment, and it provides in relevant part:
Notwithstanding any other provision of the Constitution to the
contrary, the maximum rates authorized and allocated by law for
tax levies on the several classes of property for the support of
public schools may be increased in any school district for a
period not to exceed five years, and in an amount not to exceed
one hundred percent of such maximum rates, if such increase is
at least a majority
approved, in the manner provided by law, by
196
of the votes cast for and against the same.
How, the challengers asked, could a measure explicitly blessed by the
Constitution violate that same constitution's Equal Protection
Virginia
West
Clause?
In Board of Education v. Chafin,197 issued on November 23, 1988, the
Supreme Court of Appeals agreed that matters were just that simple. Where
constitutional principles appear to conflict, general provisions must yield to
specific ones, thus "[e]xcess levies are withdrawn from the operation and scope
9
of equal protection principles."' ' Recognizing that Judge Cook's order
effectively proscribed school excess levies, the court issued a writ of prohibition
barring the order's enforcement. The local school excess levy was saved.
In light of this conclusion, the court recognized that equal protection
principles could no longer be understood to require the elimination of disparities
in school funding, for excess levies would "undoubtedly" produce such
disparities. Accordingly, it reconceptualized the mandate of Pauley v. Kelly:
We find the true focus of Pauley to be whether the State has
complied with its constitutional duty to provide school financing
in a manner, and at a level, that is thorough and efficient. This
requires an examination of the school financing formula,
without consideration of the excess levy revenues. [The key
question is:] Is the basic foundation program, the minimum level
of funding guaranteed by the State, constitutionally sufficient to
99
meet the county's education needs?1
By putting the excess levy "off the books" for equal protection purposes, Chafin
effectively forced the Pauley mandate away from its balancing of equality and

W. VA. CONST. art. X, § 10. Though the main text was added in 1958, the threshold for
passing a school excess levy was lowered from 60% to 50% through passage of the Fair Education
Opportunity Amendment in 1982. BASTRESS, CONSTITUTION, supra note 51, at 310.
376 S.E.2d 113 (W. Va. 1988).
197
Id. at 119. The court added that the same result was compelled by the principle that more
198
recent provisions prevail over earlier ones. Id.
196

199

Id. at 121.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol121/iss3/5

36

Taylor: Foreword: Pauley - and "The Recht Decision" - at Forty
2019]

PA ULEY AT FORTY

793

adequacy concerns toward a purer adequacy model. Wealthier districts
essentially had a constitutional right to provide education that is more than
"thorough and efficient," even if the comparative advantage conferred on their
students undermined the real-world adequacy of the education provided in poorer
districts. In theory, this consequence could be avoided if the state foundation aid
program were sufficiently generous to enable all districts to meet the thorough
and efficient standard and that standard were to be set so high by the legislature
(or by the courts) that no districts would wish for more. It is hard, though, to see
how these utopian conditions could ever draw sufficient political support to
become reality.
For Judge Recht (and later Judge Cook), taking away the local excess
levy had been a tying strategy: families who wanted the resources to support topflight education for their kids would have no choice but to support better funding
statewide. The interests of all would thus be tied together, regardless of
geographic location. But if the local excess levy gave families the option of
channeling support more narrowly to their own districts, statewide ties would be
broken and most voters would likely support local excess levies in preference to
broader state funding.200
Chafin, then, was a major turning point because it placed some of the
Recht Decision's goals out of reach. The most that could be hoped for was that
all children would have a right to an education that met a quality standard. And
though the Recht Decision's ambitious articulation of educational quality still
stood, the state's demonstrated unwillingness to fund the Recht Decision's
resource mandates meant that a less ambitious quality standard-one
appropriately labeled "adequacy" -would likely govern in the future. After a
few years of relative quiet in the Pauley litigation, the late 1990s brought
legislative developments that led Judge Recht to perform his own
reconceptualization of Pauley.
VII.

PA ULEY WINDS DOWN: ACCOUNTABILITY AS ADEQUACY

A. The End of the Road
Dan Hedges asked the Kanawha County Circuit Court to reopen the
Pauley case in 1994, arguing that the Master Plan approved by the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals ten years earlier still had not been implemented.2 01
Judge Dan Robinson now presided over the case, and on April 2, 1997, he issued
a ruling that the West Virginia school financing formula-nearly 20 years after

200
The two failures to pass a statewide excess levy, coupled with considerable
success in
passing local excess levies around the state for many decades, supports this prediction.
201
See Drew Lindsay, W. Va. Court Reopens Landmark Finance Case,
EDUC. WEEK, Feb. 1,
1995, availableat https://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/1995/02/01/19wva.hl4.html.
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Judge Robinson's order gave the state one year to cure the constitutional
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Equity,"
and
Quality
Recommendations of the Commission of Educational
which is now principally codified at W.Va. Code § 18-2E-5.
While West Virginia had enacted modest accountability measures as part
of an omnibus education bill in 1988,207 H.B. 4306 brought the standards and
accountability movement208 to West Virginia with full force. Its stated purpose
was "to establish a process for improving education that includes standards,
assessment, accountability and capacity building to provide assurances that a
thorough and efficient system is being provided for all West Virginia public
school students on an equal education opportunity basis and that high quality
209
On one reading, the bill meant that the
standards are, at minimum, being met."
legislature had finally taken the steps that Pauley had been urging all along: it
had given a meaningful legislative definition of a thorough and efficient

See Tomblin v. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ., No. 75-1268, slip op. at 5 (Kanawha Cty.
Cir. Ct., Jan. 3, 2003) (describing Judge Robinson's order); Robert Jay Dilger, Public School
Finance in West Virginia,WEST VIRGINIA PUB. AFF. REP., Summer 1999, at 2.
203
Dilger, supra note 202, at 3.
Linda B. Blackford, Judge Gives Lawmakers 1 Year to Implement Recht, CHARLESTON
204
GAZErE, Apr. 3, 1997, at lA.
Dilger, supra note 202, at 4-5. A separate Governor's Commission on Fair Taxation was
205
formed shortly thereafter to recommend changes to the state tax system that would, among other
things, further the goal of providing a thorough and efficient system of education. Id. The
Commission's proposals that bore most directly on school funding included replacing the regular
levy with state funding and recommending a constitutional amendment that identified the
legislature, not the courts, as the arbiter of what constitutes a thorough and efficient system of
schools. Id. at 5. These and other Commission proposals proved controversial, and thus the
Commission's main proposals were never enacted. See Calvin A. Kent, What Happened to Tax
Reform in West Virginia?, 85 STATE TAX NOTES 1127, 1130 (2017), www.cbermu.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/11/2017-09-18-StateTaxNotes-Kent.pdf.
206
H.B. 4306, 73d Leg. (W. Va. 1998).
207
S.B. 14, 68th Leg., 3d Spec. Sess. (W. Va. 1988)
208
For a brief introduction to the standards and accountability movement, see Ryan, Standards
and Testing, supranote 126, at 1226-29.
209
H.B. 4306, 73d Leg. (W. Va. 1998) (current version at W. VA. CODE ANN. § 18-2E-5(a)
202

(West 2019)).
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education, and thus it had set a coherent goal around which the other elements of
the education system could be designed. As Professor Ryan has observed, school
finance equity litigation and the standards and accountability movement are at
least "a match made in theory" because state adoption of academic standards
enables courts to avoid separation of powers concerns.210 Courts may then say to
the legislature, "We are not holding you to our standards of what counts as an
adequate education; instead, we are holding you to your standards of what counts
as an adequate education."
When Judge Recht returned to the case in 1999, it soon became apparent
that he regarded the 1998 accountability legislation as a game changer. In a
consent order dated September 12, 2000, Judge Recht granted the State Board of
Education's motion to "recognize W.Va. Code sec. 18-2E-5 as the
implementation process of ascertaining compliance with the constitutional
mandate" 2 11 and further stated that his 1983 order approving the Master Plan was
vacated insofar as it conflicted with the present order.212 Now that the legislature
had finally acted to define a thorough and efficient education, the "suggestions"
put forward in the Master Plan could fall away. This was the beginning of
Pauley's end.
Judge Recht more fully explained himself in an order issued on
December 3, 2001:
The Legislature has, in effect, with the enactment of West
Virginia Code sec. 18-2E-5, changed the paradigm of public
education from a resource to a performance model. The West
Virginia Legislature has addressed the underpinnings of an
adequate and equal education opportunity by establishing
educational standards and performance measures as well as the
method of assessing that performance in terms of its success
and/or failure, with the understanding that if there are
deficiencies and failures, resources then will be targeted
specifically to correctthose deficiencies andfailures.
This performance based accountability approach is designed to
spend and allocate resources where they are most needed,
instead of allocating resources at the beginning of the education
cycle with the hopeful expectation that the results will achieve
the highest quality standard of education.213

Ryan, Standards and Testing, supra note 126, at 1230-3 1. Ryan warns
that the standards
and accountability movement may actually do more harm than good for school finance equity
litigation. See id at 1240-50.
211
Tomblin v. Gainer, No. 75-1268, slip op. at 10 (Kanawha Cty. Cir. Ct.,
Sept. 12, 2000).
212
Id. at 9-10.
213
Tomblin v. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ., No. 75-1268, slip op. at
4 (Kanawha Cty. Cir.
Ct., Dec. 3, 2001) (emphasis added).
210
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He added that the "front-end approach" he took in 1982 was required at that time
2 14
because the evidence presented on the Pauley remand allowed no other option.
Courts have consistently recognized that the contours of a thorough and efficient
2 15
education must change with the times, and the legislature was well within its
rights to draw on the standards and accountability movement in defining a
thorough and efficient education.
Judge Recht officially relinquished jurisdiction in the case on January 3
2003.216 His order denied plaintiffs' motions for further changes to the school
foundation aid formula, indicating that a better approach would be to wait and
2 17
In addition, Judge
see how the new accountability system would play out.
Recht ruled that the 1998 Act itself satisfied constitutional requirements because
the legislature had now provided, by public law, for a thorough and efficient
system of free schools. 218 There was no need to retain jurisdiction because the
court
believe[d] that the legislative and executive branches have every
intention of doing what each says they are going to do. Prior to
1998, there was no such legislative and executive commitment
...

From this day forward, unless this matter is properly

returned to this Court, decisions regarding the classroom are out
of the legislative
of the courtroom and into the halls and 2offices
19
government.
of
branches
and executive
B. Assessing Pauley 's End

And so, after a quarter century in the courts, the Pauley litigation ended
with more of a whimper than a bang. Throughout the litigation, the West Virginia
courts had worked to find both a defensible substantive conception of the right
to education and a defensible conception of judicial review of the legislature's
efforts to implement that right. At Pauley's end, the courts' approach was less
ambitious on both fronts than it had been at the beginning.
214

Id.

See, e.g., Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.3d 273, 295 (N.J. 1973) (explaining that the content of
a thorough and efficient education today would be quite different from what it would have been in
1895 and emphasizing that the constitutional guarantee "must be understood to embrace that
educational opportunity which is needed in the contemporary setting to equip a child for his role
as a citizen and as a competitor in the labor market"). Pauley was less explicit on this point, but its
definition of a thorough and efficient school system as developing key student capacities "as best
the state of education expertise allows" reflects a recognition that the concept of a thorough and
efficient education will change over time. See Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 877 (W.Va. 1979).
216
Tomblin v. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ., No. 75-1268 (Kanawha Cty. Cir. Ct., Jan. 3,
2003).
217
Id. at 7, 12.
218
Id. at 12.
219
Id. at 14-15.
215
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Substantively, Pauley had sought to balance the demands of equality and
quality without fully working out the proper relationship between the two. The
Recht Decision further specified Pauley's ambitious qualitative standard, but
placed greater emphasis on the need for equal resources by attacking the local
excess levy. In the wake of Chafin, equality considerations became less critical,
and the substantive focus shifted to "quality" or "adequacy." Finally, the
legislature's embrace of standards and accountability changed the courts'
understanding of quality from a model based on educational inputs to one based
on outputs, i.e. standardized test scores. At Pauley's end in 2003, the meaning of
the Pauley mandate as understood by Judge Recht was that the legislature must
articulate educational content standards and provide all students with an equal
opportunity to meet those standards by targeting additional resources towards the
districts that most need them, as identified by test performance. In a nutshell, a
"thorough and efficient" educational system aims at quality/adequacy of outputs,
with resources allocated via principles of vertical equity.
This substantive endpoint is obviously quite different from, and
doubtless less demanding than, what the West Virginia courts envisioned in the
early 1980s. And much of the explanation for the change goes to the West
Virginia courts' ultimate acceptance of a more modest conception of the judicial
role in enforcing the right to education. In the end, it was the legislature's job to
specify the standards of a thorough and efficient education, even if its standards
had little in common with those originally envisioned by the Recht Decision and
the Master Plan.
One can interpret the West Virginia courts' chastened approach to
judicial review in different ways. On one common reading of the Pauley story,
the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals and Judge Recht as its agent were
exceptionally aggressive in wielding the power of judicial review. 220 The courts
sought to define their own vision of a "thorough and efficient" education de
novo, dragging elected officials and the populace by their ears toward ajudicially
defined educational utopia. Unsurprisingly, the state and its people did not fall
into line, underscoring the limits of judicial power to create social change in the
absence of public support. 2 2 1 Seen in this light, Judge Recht's relinquishment of
jurisdiction and his final gestures toward deferential review were a simple
expression ofjudicial exhaustion, which is not an uncommon endpoint for school
finance litigation.222
While this narrative of judicial hubris followed by surrender has
considerable plausibility, an alternative reading suggests that Pauley and its
progeny did not-or at least did not consistently-assert their power to
unilaterally define the details of a constitutionally satisfactory education system.
220

See, e.g, Werner, supra note 13, at 72-76.
See id. at 82 ("Until reform efforts develop a critical mass of
public support, no act of the
courts, or of the executive branch, will be effective in changing West Virginia's schools.").
222
See, e.g., Weishart, Aligning, supra note 119, at 351.
221
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Instead, the courts sought only to goad the legislature into taking its own
educational responsibilities more seriously. Specifically, the courts sought to
ensure that the legislature was genuinely aiming at the right target and to suggest
-albeit in extraordinary detail-one adequate set of means, all the while
recognizing the legislature's authority to choose alternative means so long as
223
those means were consistent with constitutional goals. On this reading, Judge
Recht's decision to relinquish jurisdiction was not-or, at least, not simply-an
act of throwing in the towel. It was instead a principled application of a more
modest vision of the judicial role than the first account would suggest. On this
reading, the legislature's adoption of a serious accountability system in 1998
represents not judicial surrender, but at least a modest victory.
I am not sure either of these readings is wholly right or wrong. Rather
than trying to choose between them or crafting some intermediate interpretation,
I want to reflect on Pauley's end by assuming that the West Virginia courts
finally and sincerely embraced a conception of judicial review that ensures the
legislature has targeted constitutional ends, yet defers substantially on the choice
of means. I contend that even on this more modest vision of judicial review, the
sense of a premature ending and a somewhat hollow victory in the Pauley
litigation is not entirely dispelled.
Judge Recht's final orders in the Pauley case envisioned the state's new
accountability system not as an end in itself, but as a more precise way of
identifying where to target additional resources so that all of West Virginia's
children might have an equal opportunity to attain a thorough and efficient
education. He wrote in his December 2001 order that if the state's accountability
system showed "deficiencies and failures [in student performance], resources
will then be targeted specifically to correct those failures." 2 24 This makes sense,
for an accountability system can in theory allow states to know where resources
are most needed rather than simply estimating ex ante that, e.g., high-poverty
schools require 30% more aid, other things being equal. Further, H.B. 4306
arguably reflected a legislative commitment to target resources in exactly the
way Judge Recht envisioned:
The state board shall use information from the system of
education performance audits to assist it in ensuring that a
thorough and efficient system of schools is being provided and
to improve student, school, and school system performance,

See Pauley v. Bailey (Recht Decision), No. 75-1268 (Kanawha Cty. Cir. Ct., May 11, 1982),
supplementedby No. 75-1268, slip op. at 9 (Kanawha Cty. Cir. Ct., May 22, 1982) (explaining that
the trial court would "suggest" through the Master Plan an approach to providing a thorough and
efficient education, but that "it is ultimately a legislative function [whether to adopt the Master
Plan], and whatever the Legislature does do, can only and will only be measured by the existing
constitutional standards").
Tomblin v. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ., No. 75-1268, slip op. at 4 (Kanawha Cty. Cir.
224
223

Ct., Dec. 3, 2001).
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including but not limited to . .. (3) targeting additional resources

when necessary to improve performance.225
This language is not self-interpreting, of course. "Additional resources"
in the statute need not be read as exclusively or even predominantly meaning
"additional financial resources." Nevertheless, it seems likely that Judge Recht
understood the promise of H.B. 4306 to be primarily about allocating additional
financial resources to help those students identified by the testing regime as
having the greatest needs.2 2 6 If the statute is read as Judge Recht apparently read
it, West Virginia's practice has not really lived up to this legislative commitment.
And to the extent this is so, West Virginia's educational system and its financing
system in particular still fall short on even the more modest conception ofjudicial
review. If the state is not actively targeting financial resources where the
accountability system says they are most needed, perhaps the state has not yet
shown that its system of free schools truly aims at a thorough, efficient, and
reasonably equal education for all.
That is a provocative charge, and-based on what I have said thus farone could fairly object that the charge seems to rest on the dubious assumption
that greater funding is both necessary and sufficient to improve underperforming
schools. This, of course, is false. Money helps if it is spent wisely,22 7 but money
is not the entire answer. 2 28 Nevertheless, the concern that West Virginia's
accountability regime has not displayed a serious commitment to targeting
resources where they are most needed can be substantiated without simplistic
assumptions.
Consider what West Virginia's accountability system tells us about the
Lincoln County schools, where the Pauley litigation started more than forty years
225

An Act Implementing

Certain Recommendations of the Commission of Educational
Quality
and Equity, H.B. 4306, 73d Leg. (W. Va. 1998) (creating proposed section W. VA. CODE § 1 8-2E5(f)). The current version of the statute, with no significant changes in wording, is codified at W.
VA. CODE ANN. § I8-2E-5(h) (West 2019).
226
In his final order closing the Pauley litigation, Judge Recht wrote: "The
performance-based
accountability approach is designed to spend and allocate resources where they are most
needed,
instead of allocating resources at the beginning of the education cycle with the hopeful expectation
that the results will achieve the highest quality standard of education." Tomblin v. West Virginia
State Bd. of Educ., No. 75-1268, slip op. at 6 (Kanawha Cty. Cir. Ct., Jan. 3, 2003) (emphasis
added).
227
See generally Michael A. Rebell, Poverty, "Meaningful" Educational
Opportunity, and the
Necessary Role of the Courts, 85 N.C. L. REv. 1467 (2006). Professor Rebell sums up his analysis
this way: "In the end, all of the elaborate economic production analyses and discussions in the
academic literature and in the legal decisions about whether money matters really comes down to
a basic consensus that, of course, money matters-if it is spent well." Id. at 1487.
228
See, e.g., Derek Black, Taking Teacher Quality Seriously, 57 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 1597,
1643 (2016) [hereinafter Black, Teacher Quality] (explaining that higher salaries alone are likely
not sufficient to attract and retain high quality teachers in schools serving poor and minority student
populations); Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, supra note 29, at 296 (expressing doubts about
whether money alone can solve the problems faced by racially isolated schools).
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ago. The West Virginia Department of Education's online accountability
database 229 indicates that for the 2017-18 school year, the proficiency rates on
statewide assessments for all West Virginia students were 45% in reading, 37%
in math, and 37% in science. 23 0 The proficiency rates for all students in Lincoln
County schools were 36% in reading (9 points below the state average), 26% in
math (11 points below the state average), and 31% in science (6 points below the
state average). 2 3 1 To add a third data point, the proficiency rates in Monongalia
County, home of West Virginia University, were 55% in reading (10 points
above the state average), 51% in math (14 points above the state average), and
50% in science (13 points above the state average). There is more to education
than standardized test scores, but the scores are relevant here because the Pauley
litigation concluded by proclaiming that West Virginia's accountability system
was an acceptable legislative measure of what constitutes a thorough and
efficient education. By that standard, it is difficult to see how Lincoln County
students are receiving an education that is either adequately equal or equally
adequate.
Lincoln County, then, would seem to be a district to which additional
resources would be appropriately targeted. But there seems to be no evidenceeither today or any other time since 2003 when Judge Recht relinquished
jurisdiction-that additional financial resources have been targeted to Lincoln
County in response to its weak test scores. According to the latest available
school finance data, Lincoln County's per student spending in 2015 was
$11,290.48, slightly below the statewide average and nearly $300 less than the
figure for Monongalia County.232 This is not to say the state has offered no extra
support to Lincoln County. State money in 2015 provided more than 87% of the
county's basic foundation allowance generated by the seven-step Public School
2 33
Support Plan formula, the third highest percentage in the state. The excess levy
explains Lincoln County's below-average per pupil spending, for the extra
support from the state is not enough to offset the disparities in the amount of
funding that can be generated by the excess levy. 23 4 The most critical point,
229
West
Virginia's
online
accountability
database
is
https://zoomwv.kl2.wv.us/Dashboard/portalHome.jsp (last visited Apr. 4, 2019).

ZooMWV,

230
These figures combine the percentages of students identified as either meeting or exceeding
the state standard.
231
Since the 2014-15 school year, Lincoln County students have registered gains in math and
science, but reading scores have fallen. The county's trend lines over the past four years are not
notably differently from the trend lines for all students.
WEST VIRGINIA DEP'T. OF EDUC., SOURCEBOOK 2015, supra note 56, at 96. The state average
232
per pupil spending was $11,369; Monongalia County's per pupil spending was $11,575. These
figures reflect total spending, including both local school excess levies and federal aid.
233
Id. at 30. In contrast, the state share of the basic foundation allowance for Monongalia
County was less than 60%. Id.
234
For example, in 2015 Monongalia County had a property tax base nearly ten times greater
than Lincoln County's: $5,330,627,025 in total assessed valuation versus $548,539,356. Id. at 7.
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however, is not just that the excess levy means Lincoln County is able to spend
less money per pupil than many counties that have both greater wealth and higher
test scores. The critical point is that there is still nothing in West Virginia's
school financing system that ties school funding to test score performance. While
West Virginia provides a larger share of support for Lincoln County schools than
for many other districts, that difference is a function of the county's lower
property tax base, not its test scores.
It is true, of course, that West Virginia uses its accountability system to
identify low-performing schools and to require various corrective measures in
those schools. Federal law-currently in the form of the Every Student Succeeds
Act2 35-requires as much.236 But West Virginia's ESSA compliance plan says
very little to suggest that additional financial resources would play a significant
part in improving low-performing schools.237 The ESSA plan criteria require
states to describe how they will "periodically review resource allocation to
support school improvement in each LEA in the State serving a significant
number or percentage of schools identified for comprehensive or targeted
support and improvement," 238 and reviewing resource allocation for lowperforming schools does sound like a step down the path Judge Recht envisioned.
The Department of Education's response, however, points only to the possibility
of "blending funds across existing resources" to support "comprehensive support
and improvement" (CSI) schools.239 It is unclear how much money might be
available for reallocation, or how the envisioned "blending" would work.
Perhaps it is unsurprising that states would not specifically promise
greater financial resources to failing schools. Such a scheme might seem to set
up perverse incentives, and since it obviously matters how the money is spent,
one would expect any increase in financial resources to be one part of a more
comprehensive school improvement scheme. All that makes sense. But a real
commitment of financial resources would probably need to be a part of an
effective school improvement plan as well, and the simplest way to make the
Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA), Pub. L. No. 114-95, 129 Stat. 1802
(2015) (codified
at 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301, et seq.).
236
For a brief description of the ESSA's requirements, see Derek W. Black,
Abandoning the
FederalRole in Education: The Every Student Succeeds Act, 105 CALIF. L. REv. 1309, 1334-35
(2017). Professor Black explains that the ESSA's mandate for corrective action in low-performing
schools is significantly more flexible and less stringent than that of its predecessor, the No Child
Left Behind Act. See id. at 1325, 1334-35.
235

237

WEST VIRGINIA'S CONSOLIDATED STATE PLAN FOR THE
ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY
1965, AS AMENDED BY THE EVERY STUDENT SUCCEEDS ACT OF 2015 (2018),

EDUCATION ACT OF

https://wveis.kl2.wv.us/essa/docs/WV ESSA Plan Edit 022018.pdf. Pages 35 to 47 describe
West Virginia's processes for identifying low performing schools, specifying "exit criteria" for
schools so identified, providing comprehensive support to low-performing schools, and providing
"more rigorous interventions" for schools that fail to meet the exit criteria in three
years.
238
Id. at 40.
239
Id. at 40-41.
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point is to reflect on the most important component of a good school system:
high-quality teachers.
Researchers have repeatedly confirmed that good teaching matters and
24 0
Children who live in highthat good teachers are unevenly distributed.
minority, high-poverty, and/or geographically isolated schools and districts are
far less likely to have high-quality teachers than children in whiter, wealthier
schools in more populated areas.24 1 Judge Recht identified the teacher quality
gap as a problem in West Virginia back in 1982.242 Commendably, the ESSA
recognizes the problem and accordingly requires state compliance plans to
explain what steps states will take to ensure that students in schools identified
for improvement "are not served at disproportionate rates by ineffective, out-of243
As Professor Black has explained, it is a
field, or inexperienced teachers."
mistake to think that higher salaries alone would close the teacher quality gap,
but it is also a mistake to think that significant salary incentives are
unnecessary. 2" Indeed, one of the reasons for the intractability of the teacher
quality gap is that where salary supplements have been tried, they have not
proven sufficiently robust to overcome other disincentives for high-quality
2 45
teachers to be willing to work in schools they see as less desirable. In West
Virginia, one of the positive developments that arose from the Pauley litigation
was 1984 legislation providing for greater equity in teacher pay across the
various districts in the state. 246 As a result, variations in teacher pay across
47
districts have been significantly reduced,2 but relatively equal pay is likely not
enough to overcome the teacher quality gap that affects districts like Lincoln

Black, Teacher Quality, supra note 228, at 1607-09. Professor Black's article draws
together a wide range of the existing research on the teacher quality gap and the policies that would
be needed to close it. Readers wishing to dig deeper into the question can find comprehensive
guidance in his citations.
241
Id. at 1643.
See Pauley v. Bailey (Recht Decision),No. 75-1268, slip op. at 135-36 (Kanawha Cty. Cir.
242
Ct., May 11, 1982) (explaining that "[p]roperty poor counties are unable to attract and retain highly
qualified teachers").
243
ESSA § 111l1(g)(1)(B), codified at 20 U.S.C. § 631 1(g)(1)(B) (West 2018).
Black, Teacher Quality, supra note 228, at 1643 ("School finance theory would have us
244
believe that if schools serving predominantly poor and minority students just had more money,
they could attract and retain better teachers. This is true only to some extent and depends on how
much money is at stake.").
245
Id. at 1637-39.
S.B. 131, 66th Leg. (W. Va. 1984) (amending various sections in W. VA. CODE ANN. § 18246
9A-1 (West 2019), the section containing the Public School Support Plan).
WEST VIRGINIA DEP'T OF EDUC., SOURCEBOOK 2015, supra note 56, at 138 (table showing
247
that in the 2014-2015 school year, the average salary for classroom teachers was $45,783 with a
high salary of $49,182 and a low of $41,985). Lincoln County's figure was just below the state
average, while Monongalia County's was near the top, but if one adjusts for cost of living in the
two districts, the claim of rough equality is plausible.
240
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County. Of course, adjusting teacher salaries to provide incentives for highquality teachers to work in low-performing districts would be complex politically
and legally since teacher expectations and existing collective bargaining
agreements would be implicated. 24 8 But these are issues that would need to be
addressed in any serious effort to target additional resources-financial and
otherwise-to districts and schools with poor test results. It is difficult to see how
one might improve low-performing schools without quality teachers, and it is
just as difficult to see how such schools can attract and retain quality teachers
without raising salaries.
Admittedly, the preceding account is just a sketch.24 9 Much more work
would need to be done to translate these ideas into a workable scheme for
addressing teacher quality issues in low-performing schools, and of course
improving teacher quality is only one aspect-albeit the most important one-of
school improvement. My goal is only to suggest how it might be possible to
adjust school financing in ways that directly respond to the findings of an
accountability system. Suppose, however, that one is skeptical that this can be
done. What then?
There is another, far more common approach that also ties school finance
to student educational need. If targeting additional resources ex post on the basis
of text scores seems unworkable, a rough and ready substitute is to provide
additional resources ex ante based on student or district poverty. We have long
known that economically disadvantaged students are generally more expensive
to educate.250 Indeed, the Recht Decision recognized this fact back in 1982.251
And it is certainly feasible to incorporate the greater needs of poor students into
school financing formulas. The vast majority of states do so now. 25 2 Thirty-two
states take poverty into account through student-based funding formulas. Under
this approach, district per-pupil allocations start from a baseline that reflects the
assumed costs of educating a student with no special needs or disadvantages. The
formulas then apply multipliers that increase the funding level for each individual
See Black, Teacher Quality, supra note 228, at 1649.
249
As Professor Black points out, school finance litigation and the literature
on teacher quality
tend to oversimplify the problems, and my sketch undoubtedly does the same. A comprehensive
approach would attend to broadening the supply of potential quality teachers entering the
profession and retaining quality teachers as well as issues of teacher distribution. Higher salariesmore specifically, salaries that make teaching competitive with comparable professions in the labor
market-are only part of the picture. See id. at 1657-58.
250
See Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, supra note 29, at 285-86.
251
See Pauley v. Bailey (Recht Decision), No. 75-1268, slip
op. at 128 (Kanawha Cty. Cir. Ct.,
May 11, 1982) (explaining that a constitutional school financing structure would have to take into
account factors affecting educational cost including "concentrations of educationally
disadvantaged and culturally isolated students").
252
See National Policy Maps: Poverty, EDBUILD, http://funded.edbuild.org/national#poverty
(last visited Apr. 5, 2019) (graphic illustrating that all but 9 states directly take poverty into account
in their school funding formulas).
248

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2019

47

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 121, Iss. 3 [2019], Art. 5

804

WEST VIRGINIA LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 121

student on the basis of student characteristics that indicate greater educational
need: e.g., poverty or disability. Another 22 states adjust overall district funding
on the basis of district concentrations of impoverished students. And some states
do both. 253
West Virginia does neither. 25 4 Its seven-step foundational aid formula is
resource-based, relying on calculations of the resources needed to run the public
schools in each district. 255 The formula does take some district variations into
account, and the legislature has made numerous changes over the years in
response to the Pauley litigation.2 56 Perhaps most notably, the legislature in 2008
adjusted some elements of the school foundation formula to use different
257
These changes
multipliers based on a county district's population density.
work to funnel somewhat greater resources to rural, sparsely populated districts
in order to compensate for higher transportation costs and limited ability to take
advantage of economies of scale. As a practical matter, the changes probably
direct more funds to poorer students, but these effects are incidental. The school
funding formula fails to directly account for the greater costs of educating poor
students in the ways that most states do, and any shift in resources toward poor
258
students that exists under West Virginia's formula is far smaller than needed.
To sum up, accountability systems might help school financing systems
produce a thorough and efficient education for all by providing hard information
about where additional financial and other resources are most needed. Less
precisely but more commonly, school financing formulas might take the greater
educational needs of poor students into account ex ante by explicitly
incorporating student or district poverty levels. That West Virginia has done
neither raises doubts about whether the accountability approach adopted in 1998
should really be understood as fulfilling Pauley'smandate and about whether the
See id.
See id. The other states that make no allowance for student or district poverty are Florida,
Georgia, Alabama, South Dakota, Arizona, Idaho, and Alaska.
EdBuild provides an explanation of resource-based formulas and a graphic identifying the
255
states that primarily use such formulas. See National Policy Maps: Formula Type, EDBUTLD,
http://funded.edbuild.org/national#formula-type (last visited Apr. 5, 2019).
Cataloguing every one of these changes is a task beyond the scope of this article. For a
256
helpful summary of changes in the first ten years after the Recht Decision, see Jeanette A. Sites
Richard Salmon, West Virginia'sSchool Finance:A Look at the Past and the Present, 17 J. EDUC.
FIN. 318, 328-36 (1992).
257
H.B. 4588, 78th Leg. (W. Va. 2008) (amending parts of school aid formula in W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 18-9A-1) (West 2019)). For a brief description of how these changes affect the school
funding formula, see WEST VIRGINIA DEP'T OF EDUC., SOURCEBOOK 2015, supra note 56, at 2526.
258
See BRUCE D. BAKER, DANIELLE FARRIE, & DAVID SCIARRA, IS SCHOOL FUNDING FAIR? A
2018),
ed.
(7th
11
CARD
REPORT
NATIONAL
http://www.edlawcenter.org/assets/files/pdfs/publications/Is SchoolFundingFair 7th Editi.pdf
(finding that West Virginia's funding scheme is essentially flat, providing only slightly greater
funding in high-poverty than in low-poverty districts).
253

&

254
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West Virginia courts bowed out of the case too soon, even assuming a more
modest conception of the judicial role.
To the extent that Pauley v. Kelly, and later Judge Recht, scaled back
their vision of judicial review, that vision still requires courts to ensure that the
legislature has adopted the ends required by the constitution and that it has
chosen some set of means that can be reasonably seen as directed towards
achieving those ends. On this more modest conception, the Recht Decision was
never more than one set of possible means. When the Pauley litigation began,
West Virginia had not really taken aim at the goal of a "thorough and efficient"
education. As Judge Recht put it in 1982, there was no way he could give
significant weight to the legislature's standards on remand because the existing
state standards were too vague and inadequate to count as a definition of a
thorough and efficient school system. 25 9 In other words, West Virginia's
statutory framework for education looked no different than if the state
constitution had required the legislature to provide merely a general system of
public schools, not a thorough and efficient system.260 If judicial review means
anything, it surely means that courts can demand that legislatures aim at
constitutionally appointed goals. The Pauley courts did this, and their efforts
were rewarded. Just as Judge Recht concluded, the West Virginia legislature met
its responsibility to define the contours of a thorough and efficient system of
schools through adopting a regime of standards and accountability in 1998. The
legislature had finally taken aim at its constitutional target in a substantive way.
Yet truly meaningful judicial review under state education clauses
requires courts to do more than merely ensure that the legislature has formally
adopted the proper ends. Courts must also ask whether the means are at least
reasonably related to those ends, for at a certain point the choice of means can
become so irrational as to cast doubt on whether the legislature is genuinely
seeking the purported ends at all. Judge Recht made the importance of meansend review clear in 1982: "The state has a legal duty to provide equal educational
opportunities by allocating resources to counties according to criteria
substantially related to educational needs and costs."261 The state's chosen
means, its school financing system, must use criteria that are substantially related
to educational needs if the state is to rationally aim at a thorough and efficient
education for all. Given how much we know about poverty's impact on
educational needs and costs, it is doubtful that a state funding system can
rationally aim at a thorough and efficient education for all without explicitly
259

See Pauley v. Bailey (Recht Decision), No. 75-1268, slip
op. at 92 (Kanawha Cty. Cir. Ct.,

May 11, 1982).

260
This may be another respect in which the Pauley litigation was
influenced by New Jersey's
approach in Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 295 (N.J. 1973) ("Surely, the existing statutory
system is not visibly geared to the mandate that there be a 'thorough and efficient' [system of
public schools]. Indeed the State has never spelled out the content of the educational opportunity
the Constitution requires.").
261
Recht Decision, slip op. at 217.
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taking student poverty into account. And the point can be pushed still further. As
my colleague Joshua Weishart has pointed out, West Virginia has never even
commissioned a "costing out" study that would seek to determine what it would
actually cost to produce the results the legislature has selected as defining a
thorough and efficient education. 2 6 2 Even on a relatively modest vision ofjudicial
review that defers significantly to the legislature's choice of means, courts might
question whether the legislature's commitment to the end of a thorough and
efficient education for all runs as deep as the state constitution requires.
Litigation in other states-most famously, in New Jersey-has
proceeded in two broad phases: a first designed to produce a legislative plan for
2 63
and a second
an educational system meeting constitutional requirements,
fruit for all
real
bear
commitments
legislative
the
that
ensure
to
designed
2
first phase
the
with
2003
in
ended
litigation
students. 6 West Virginia's
Secondstate.
the
in
begun
ever
has
phase
second
no
seemingly complete, but
26 5 and they are still
states,
other
in
phase suits have been brought successfully
being brought. Indeed, a suit based on a "failure to adjust resources in response
to performance measures" theory survived a motion to dismiss in the Delaware
Chancery Court late last year.266 Plaintiffs pointed to Delaware's accountability
system as a legislative declaration of a substantive educational guarantee, then
compared the goal to the disappointing test results achieved by "disadvantaged
students," i.e. low-income students, disabled students, and English language
learners. The theory, approved in principle by the trial court, was that Delaware
had failed these classes of disadvantaged students by failing to provide the
resources needed to meet the state's own definition of an adequate education.
When Judge Recht relinquished jurisdiction over the Pauley litigation in
2003, he was properly satisfied that the state had finally taken aim at the proper
constitutional goal, and he was confident that the state's choice of means would
rationally support the ends identified by the new accountability system. That
West Virginia has neither accounted for poverty in its school funding system nor
performed a cost adequacy study suggests that Judge Recht's confidence has not
been completely rewarded. The time may not be right to continue the battle for
adequately equal educational opportunity in West Virginia through the courts.
262

JOSHUA E. WEISHART, LONG OVERDUE: AN ADEQUACY COST STUDY IN WEST VIRGINIA 6

https://joshuaweishart.com/wpOVERDUE],
LONG
WEISHART,
[hereinafter
(2019)
content/uploads/2019/0 1/Long-Overdue-An-Adequacy-Cost-Study-in-West-Virginia.pdf
263
As in the Robinson v. Cahill sequence of cases in New Jersey, culminating in the 1976
decision that New Jersey legislation passed in response to the Robinson litigation was facially
constitutional. Robinson v. Cahill, 355 A.2d 129 (N.J. 1976).
As in the Abbott v. Burke (Abbott I), 495 A.2d 376 (N.J. 1985), sequence of cases in New
264
Jersey. For an overview of the New Jersey litigation, see generally Paul L. Tractenberg, Beyond
EducationalAdequacy: Looking Backwardand ForwardThrough the Lens ofNew Jersey, 4 STAN.
J. C.R. & C.L. 411 (2008).
265
See, e.g., Abbott v. Burke (Abbott IV), 693 A.2d 417 (N.J. 1997).
266
Delawareans for Educ. Opportunity v. Carney, 199 A.3d 109 (Del. Ch. 2018).
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Still, we should not forget that Pauley's core promise of a thorough and efficient
education remains unfulfilled for many West Virginians. Courts cannot change
that by themselves, and it can fairly be said that the Pauley litigation might have
produced greater change had there been more public support for Pauley's twin
goals of promoting quality and equality in West Virginia education. Perhaps the
teachers' strikes and this spring's resistance to S.B. 451 can be seen as an effort
to realize the vision that the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals put
forward forty years ago.267 If so, one hopes that popular political commitment to
Pauley's constitutional vision will one day finish the job the courts started.
VIII.

PAULEY'S LEGACY.

Pauley articulated a vision of the right to education that was and is
normatively attractive because it properly insisted on the importance of both
educational quality and educational equality. That vision should still command
the allegiance of West Virginians, and recent political events suggest that for
many West Virginians, it still does. While much work remains to make Pauley's
vision a reality, the decision moved the state's education system forward in
several ways:2 68
First, Pauley has resulted in a substantial increase in West Virginia's
overall level of investment in primary and secondary education. A 2018 study
from Rutgers and the Education Law Center based on 2015 data ranked West
Virginia 22nd among states in its educational funding level with an adjusted
figure of $9,932 per student. 269 That might not sound especially impressive, but
the study ranks West Virginia ahead of much wealthier states including
California (32nd), Florida (41st), and North Carolina (47th). More tellingly,
West Virginia is one of only seven states to receive an A grade on "fiscal effort,"
a measure that indexes state and local education spending in relation to a state's
ability to generate revenue. 270 Together, these measures portray a relatively poor
state with a greater commitment to support education than many of its wealthier
neighbors. That level of commitment is unimaginable without Pauley.

267
See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
268
My colleague Robert Bastress, supra note 51, provides a cogent summary
of Pauley's
practical impact at 324-26. My observations largely track those of Professor Bastress.
269

BAKER, FARRIE, & SCIARRA, supra note 258, at 10. The study's
funding level measure is

based on a model that "predicts average funding levels while controlling for . . student poverty,
regional wage variation, and school district size and density." Id. at 9. On a less optimistic note,
however, West Virginia is like many states in that funding levels have yet to fully rebound from

the Great Recession of 2008. See WEISHART, LONG OVERDUE, supranote 262, at 15-16.
270
BAKER, FARRIE, & SCIARRA, supra note 258, at 15-16. The study measures
fiscal effort in

relation to both personal income and gross state product. West Virginia was in the top group of
seven states on the personal income measure and in the top group of twelve states on the gross state
product measure.
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Second, Pauley's emphatic insistence that education funding is a state
responsibility-along with Tax Limitation Amendments in 1932 and 1982-has
resulted in the state assuming a larger share of responsibility for the education
budget. 27 1 According to the West Virginia Department of Education, the state
provides 57.4% of the revenue supporting the public schools, while local
governments contribute 32.6% and the federal government contributes 10%.272
Other things being equal, a higher proportion of state funding produces greater
fairness by compensating for local revenue shortfalls in property-poor districts
and by substituting more progressive modes of taxation (i.e. income taxation) for
regressive property taxation regimes.
Third, Pauley and the Recht Decision led to the creation of a robust
statewide school facilities system and significant investment in new school
27 3
While the School Building
construction, particularly during the 1990s.
and have been
consolidation
school
promoted
criteria
Authority's funding
274
and quality
spending
facilities
that
denying
no
criticized on that score, there is
have improved.
Fourth, Pauley and the Recht Decision were significant factors in
prompting the state to reform its system of property tax appraisal and assessment
in 1990.275

Fifth, Pauley established that educational classifications are subject to
The application of this stringent standard has led to a series of
scrutiny.
strict
supreme court decisions protecting the right to education from a varied set of
infringements.2 76
Sixth, Pauley solidified the principle that education has constitutionally
preferred status in West Virginia's budget. The Supreme Court of Appeals of
277
West Virginia has been consistently willing to enforce this principle, which

Shifting funding responsibility away from localities and toward the state has been a constant
in school finance equity litigation from the beginning. Some of the earliest cases won by reformers
featured levels of local funding responsibility that would be hard to imagine today. See, e.g., Horton
v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359, 366 (Conn. 1977) (finding that local funding paid for 70% of the
Connecticut school budget). For discussion of West Virginia's Tax Limitation Amendments, see
BASTRESS, CONSTITUTION, supra note 51, at 284-86, 292-94.
272
WEST VIRGINIA DEP'T OF EDUC., SOURCEBOOK 2015, supra note 56, at 55.
See Bastress, The Impact of Litigation, supra note 62, at 32-36; Purdy, supra note 145, at
273
271

175-79, 185-88.
274
See generally Bastress, The Impact ofLitigation,supra note 62, and Purdy, supranote 145.
See supra note 146.
See, e.g., Shrewsbury v. Bd. of Educ., Wyoming Cty., 265 S.E.2d 767 (W. Va. 1980)
(ordering school board to provide transportation to children living on a poorly maintained road,
even at the cost of purchasing additional vehicles smaller than a school bus); Cathe A. v. Doddridge
Cty. Bd. of Educ., 490 S.E.2d 340 (W. Va. 1977) (holding that students expelled from West
Virginia schools must be provided with a free education in an alternative educational environment).
See West Virginia Educ. Ass'n v. Legislature of West Virginia, 369 S.E.2d 454 (W. Va.
277
1988); State ex rel. Bd. of Educ. v. Rockefeller, 281 S.E.2d 131 (W. Va. 1981).
275
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probably plays some part in explaining the state's relatively strong record for
investing in education.
Pauley's legacy regarding inter-district equity-the core issue that
birthed school finance equity litigation-is more mixed. The constitutional
invulnerability of the excess levy means that inter-district equity can never be
perfect, of course. But if equity is measured "horizontally" in terms of per capita
student spending, West Virginia fares well. Indeed, a 2012 study by the New
America Foundation ranked West Virginia second behind Hawaii in inter-district
equity.278 In addition, an array of minor changes to the state financing system in
the years since Pauley has helped to address the greater resource needs of rural,
sparsely populated counties.2 79
On the other hand, studies that prize "vertical equity"-i.e. targeting
greater resources toward students with greater needs-give West Virginia
lukewarm reviews. The Rutgers/Education Law Center study measures interdistrict equity by asking "whether a state's funding system recognized the need
for additional resources for students in settings of concentrated student
poverty."280 State finance systems are regarded as progressive if they allocate at
least 5% more funding for high (30%) poverty districts than for low (0%) poverty
districts. West Virginia's funding distribution is essentially flat, which warrants
a grade of C.281 As I have already indicated, West Virginia's resource-based
school financing formula does not adjust funding levels to account for student or
district poverty. As Judge Recht saw in 1982, recognizing that high-poverty
schools need greater resources should be seen as a key part of the Pauley
mandate.282
The Rutgers/Education Law Center Study identifies other troubling facts
about the compensation and distribution of teachers in West Virginia's public
schools. We know, and have known for a long time, that good teachers matter.
And as a matter of simple economics, attracting and retaining good teachers
requires competitive wages. 283 Yet using 2015 data, the Rutgers/ELC study
ranked West Virginia only 33rd in providing competitive wages for teachers. A
25-year old teacher in West Virginia in 2015 made only 79% of the salary of
other 25-year old professionals in the same labor markets with similar levels of
education and hours worked.284 We also know that smaller class sizes matter,
particularly for students in high-poverty schools. From an equity standpoint,
then, the distribution of teachers ought to be skewed toward high-poverty
278
Cited in BASTRESS, CONSTITUTION, supra note 51, at 324 n.9. As Hawaii
has only one school
district, its inter-district equity is necessarily perfect.
279
See supra notes 256-257 and accompanying
text.
280

BAKER, FARRIE, & SCIARRA, supra note
258, at 9.

281

Id. at 11.
See supra notes 250-258 and accompanying
text.
See supra notes 240-249 and accompanying
text.
BAKER, FARRIE, & SCIARRA, supra note 258,
at 24, 26.

282
283
284
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districts. West Virginia's distribution of teachers, like its distribution of funding
resources, is essentially flat.285
In sum, Pauley has done a lot of good for West Virginia, but much
remains to be done. Recent teacher strikes suggest that West Virginia educators
hold fast to Pauley's promise of a free, thorough and efficient system of public
education for all West Virginians. Yet frustration with the slow pace of change,
perhaps coupled with cynical doubts that public education in the poorest West
Virginia counties can ever be made thorough and efficient, has brought the state
to a crossroads. Will West Virginia redouble its commitment to make the public
schools thorough and efficient for all students? Or did the introduction of S.B.
451 signal that West Virginia is about to head down what teachers perceived as
28 6
a slippery slope toward privatization? The first path regards Pauley as a beacon
of a better future; the second regards it as a mistake. The path West Virginians
choose will determine whether the legacy of "Pauley at 50" will be worth
celebrating.

285

Id. at 24, 27.

286

After the failure of S.B. 451, Senate President Mitch Carmichael lamented that the

"champions of the status quo" had won, but added that the teachers' victory "will not stop progress.
They're on the wrong side of history." Brad McElhinny, House Votes to Table Omnibus Education
2019),
19,
(Feb.
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Indefinitely,
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1 02 1
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9/
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ahead-of-house-vote/. President Carmichael's comments suggest that West Virginia teachers
properly grasped the stakes when they chose to draw the line at the first steps toward school
privatization.
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